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ABSTRACT
The foundation of property law has been much debated in recent
years, as several scholars have sought to provide a theoretical alternative to
what they call the dominant, “law-and-economics” approach to property.
In place of the law-and-economics approach, these scholars advance a new
theoretical approach, which I call “the new progressive property.” At its
core, this new approach favors rules thought to promote the collective wellbeing of the larger community while ensuring that relatively disadvantaged
members of society have access to certain basic resources. This Article
explores the boundaries and practical implications of the new progressive
property. To do so, I focus on two potential examples of this theoretical
approach related to low-income housing: the federal Section 8 housing
voucher program and local rent-control ordinances. I argue that Section 8
is a better example than rent control of the new progressive-property
approach, even though rent control has previously been identified as a
practical example of the new progressive property and Section 8 has not.
I then turn to examine a deep conflict at the intersection of Section 8
and rent control, which presents an important opportunity to further test
and refine the new progressive property. In particular, I argue that this
underexamined low-income housing conflict provides good reasons to
abandon rent control, even from a progressive-property perspective. In
addition, the low-income housing conflict between Section 8 and rent
control sheds light on the ambiguous relationship between law-andeconomics analysis and the progressive-property framework. More
specifically, I argue that the conflict between rent control and Section 8
demonstrates that even the most basic law-and-economics tools must be
incorporated into a progressive-property framework to achieve the ends of
the new progressive property.
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The New Progressive Property
I. INTRODUCTION

For much of the past decade, groups of landlords in rent-controlled
jurisdictions have sought to exploit the intersection between the federal
Section 8 housing voucher program1 and local rent-control ordinances,2
arguing that the baseline eviction standards set forth in the federal
program preempt the more tenant-protective eviction controls present in
rent-control ordinances. More specifically, these landlords have issued
form notices purporting to evict Section 8–assisted tenants in
rent-controlled units for reasons acceptable under federal regulations but
precluded by local rent-control ordinances. Predictably, these efforts
prompted a spate of state and federal litigation by tenants-rights
advocates.3 Although the preemption issues central to this litigation are
important in their own right, beyond them lurks a larger, more
interesting, and more significant problem: namely, the underlying conflict
at the intersection of Section 8 and local rent-control ordinances, despite
their superficially similar progressive aims.
This low-income housing conflict is important in its own right, but its
true significance lies in what it can teach us about the broader picture
and theoretical foundations of property law. In recent years, several
scholars have advanced a new foundation for the law of property, based
in part on the claim that property law and property theory implicate
plural and incommensurable values. These accounts also suggest that the
dominant conception of property today, which focuses on protecting
individual property rights and maximizing the efficient distribution of
resources, is inadequate both for conflict resolution and for institutional
1. In 1974, Congress created the federal Section 8 housing voucher program “[f]or the
purpose of aiding low-income families in obtaining a decent place to live and of promoting
economically mixed housing.” 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (2006). For a more detailed discussion of
Section 8, see discussion infra Part III.A.
2. Given the long and varied history of rent control in this country, local rent-control
ordinances come in a variety of forms and may be designed to achieve varying ends. Nevertheless,
one can find broad similarities and common themes. For example, many local rent-control
ordinances are designed, in whole or in part, to mitigate the displacement of “senior citizens,
persons on fixed incomes and low and moderate income households” from “decent, safe and
sanitary housing.” See L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 15, § 151.01 (2012), available at
http://bit.ly/ReEuEn. For a more detailed discussion of the history and variety of local rent-control
ordinances generally, and LARSO in particular, see discussion infra Part III.B.
3. See, e.g., Barrientos v. 1801–1825 Morton LLC, 583 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2009). This
litigation has largely ended in defeat for the landlord groups’ position. Id. at 1215 (holding eviction
restrictions in local rent-control ordinances are not preempted by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development’s Section 8 regulations “to the extent the HUD regulation[s] permit[] eviction
to obtain a higher rent[]”).
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design.4 By their own lights, these recent accounts of property law and
property theory are “progressive” and bear a “family resemblance” to
each other.5 Accordingly, I coin and use the term “the new progressive
property” to refer to the common values and ends these accounts
endorse.6
4. Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
743, 743 (2009) [hereinafter Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property]; see also ERIC T.
FREYFOGLE, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY: FINDING COMMON GROUND ON THE OWNERSHIP OF LAND xiv
(2007) (claiming that “[a]t the center of today’s debate . . . lies a collective failure . . . to think clearly
and intently about the institution [of private property],” which, “[i]n operation[,] . . . is less an
individual right than a tool society uses to promote overall social good”); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER,
ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 3, 6–7 (2000) (noting the pervasiveness of the
Blackstonian “ownership model” of property, which is both “misleading and morally deficient,”
because it fails to consider the multiple “tensions within the concept of property itself,” the
resolution of which requires “controversial value judgments . . . between conflicting interests”);
LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 100 (2003) (emphasis
omitted) (noting that the “interdependent nature of property interests—the fact that protection of
one person’s property interest so often affects the property interests of others—explains why
property rights so often lack, and should lack, presumptive power”); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property
as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 1938–58 (2005) (suggesting that the appropriate vision of
property “starts with an understanding of ownership, not primarily as a means of separating
individuals . . . but of tying them together into social groups”); Jedediah Purdy, A FreedomPromoting Approach to Property: A Renewed Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237,
1243 (2005) (noting that in contrast to libertarian theories of property, “the freedom-promoting
[property] standpoint” for which he argues “does not conceive of property as a fixed and immutable
category” but rather a “dynamic institution” and a series of evolving rules).
5. In calling these recent accounts “progressive,” I use a label that many of the authors of
these recent accounts have themselves adopted, and one that some commentators about these
recent accounts have adopted as well. See, e.g., Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property,
supra note 4, at 743 (entitled “A Statement of Progressive Property”); see also Jane B. Baron, The
Contested Commitments of Property, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 917, 924, 924 & n.12 (2010) (grouping
together many of the accounts discussed in this Article under the label “progressive theories,” in
contrast to “informational theories” of property). My claim that these accounts have a close family
relationship to one another is echoed by some recent progressive accounts themselves and the
works of some commentators. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in
American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 748 & n.7 (2009) [hereinafter Alexander, The
Social-Obligation Norm] (gathering “examples of other scholarly works that bear a family
resemblance” to the works in that Symposium); James J. Kelly, Jr., Land Trusts that Conserve
Communities, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 69, 69–70 (2009) (grouping together many of the accounts
discussed in this Article, and suggesting that community land trusts provide a way to realize these
accounts’ common values and ends).
6. I am mindful that this broad grouping brings together a wide variety of potentially
divergent theories and that some scholars whose work is included under this umbrella term might
have reservations about the wholesale inclusion of their work under this label. See, e.g., Jedediah
Purdy, A Few Questions About the Social-Obligation Norm, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 949 (2009) (raising
questions about the implications of Alexander’s Article, despite Alexander’s inclusion of his
previous work within the larger “family” of progressive accounts). But see Gregory S. Alexander,
Pluralism and Property, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1030–32 (2011) [hereinafter Alexander,
Pluralism and Property] (including Purdy’s work as an example of the pluralistic social-obligation
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The new progressive property is both prescriptive and at least
partially descriptive: On the one hand, the new progressive property is
prescriptive insofar as it seeks to prescribe new or revive forsaken
normative approaches to property law and theory.7 On the other hand,
the new progressive property is at least partially descriptive insofar as it
contends that American property law, at times, already recognizes the
goals it endorses.8 For example, rent control has already been identified
by some recent progressive accounts as a practical example of the
theoretical ideal for which they argue.9 To take another example, I argue
in this Article that the federal Section 8 housing voucher program, which
has previously been overlooked in recent progressive-property accounts,
fits the descriptive characteristics of the new progressive property at least
as well as many local rent-control ordinances.10 Accordingly, Section 8
and rent control are independently useful programs to examine the new
progressive property in some detail; and the low-income housing conflict
at their intersection provides an even more fruitful testing ground for the
new progressive property in theory and practice.
Already, these recent progressive-property accounts have sparked
theory he advances). Nevertheless, the term “the new progressive property” is useful because it
captures essential common themes, values, and characteristics found across these accounts, which
are discussed in substantial detail below. See infra Part II, and especially notes 22–28 and
accompanying text.
I am also mindful that some critics of the new progressive property have questioned whether these
recent accounts possess a degree of consensus substantial enough for practical implementation. See,
e.g., Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in American
Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 960 (2009) (noting that “[i]t is hard to be against human
flourishing, and a concept that is in one form or another central to Aristotle, Aquinas, Catholic
social thought, modern virtue ethics, some forms of natural law, and the capabilities approach . . .
but one can question the degree of consensus required for implementation in a legal regime”).
Indeed, this Article explores and addresses this criticism through its close comparison of the federal
Section 8 housing voucher program and local rent-control ordinances to the values and ends of the
new progressive-property approach. See infra Parts III.A and II.B.
7. See Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 5, at 819 (arguing that “although
American property law implicitly includes a robust social-obligation norm,” courts and scholars
must work to fully identify, develop, and apply this norm); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 821, 863–64 (2009) (stating that “the purpose of this Article is . . . to reintroduce
the Aristotelian ethical tradition into discussions of property and land-use as an approach with much
to offer, one that has been neglected by contemporary property scholars”).
8. See Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 5, at 748 (arguing that
“American property law at times and in some places recognizes something like the social-obligation
norm I propose here,” if “only sporadically and implicitly”); Peñalver, supra note 7, at 883 (stating
that “the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in [State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971),]
exemplifies, in many ways, the rich pluralism of the approach I am advocating”).
9. See infra Part III.B.
10. See infra Parts III.A, III.B, IV.B.
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detailed criticism,11 thoughtful commentary,12 and enthusiastic
acclaim.13 What remains to be done is a close examination of the new
progressive property on some of its own terms by carefully considering
the plural and incommensurable underlying values, purposes, and social
relationships14 that recent progressive-property accounts seek to serve.
Such an approach should also take into account a potentially “vexing
problem” that progressive-property theorists have already recognized:
namely, what reasoning processes are needed to balance the plural
values of the new progressive property in practice?15 In addition, such
an approach should examine the new progressive property on the terms
advanced by some of its critics, especially the claims for and criticisms of
the new progressive property as they relate to institutional relationships
and institutional design.16 Because recent progressive-property accounts
emphasize the importance of contextual analysis,17 these tasks will be
served best by testing the new progressive property against specific
property regimes and doctrines that embody some or all of the
characteristics of recent progressive accounts.
This Article addresses all of these needs by examining the new
progressive property through a series of focusing lenses: namely, the
federal Section 8 housing voucher program, local rent-control
ordinances, and the potential for conflict that arises out of their
intersection. Some have suggested that the recent progressive-property
accounts cohere as little more than a grab-bag of largely unrelated values

11. E.g., Eric R. Claeys, Virtue and Rights in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
889 (2009); Smith, supra note 6; Katrina M. Wyman, Should Property Scholars Embrace Virtue
Ethics? A Skeptical Comment, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 991 (2009).
12. E.g., Baron, supra note 5.
13. E.g., Kelly, supra note 5.
14. See, e.g., Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, supra note 4, at 743
(claiming that “[p]roperty implicates plural and incommensurable values . . . such as environmental
stewardship, civic responsibility, and . . . human . . . dignity,” and that the purpose of property law
ought to be the promotion of these values, which “implicates moral and political conceptions of just
social relationships” and just distribution of resources).
15. See Alexander, Pluralism and Property, supra note 6, at 1051 (claiming that “property
theorists who are pluralist need to attend to the vexing problem of . . . exactly, analytically, what
[reasoning process] does this balancing process [between incommensurable values] involve?”).
16. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 6, at 970 (claiming that “if there is anything legal scholars do
better than economists, social scientists, and philosophers, it is institutional design,” and arguing
that legal scholars should embrace this role).
17. See, e.g., Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, supra note 4, at 744
(claiming that deliberation about property entitlements should be the product of contextual
reflection).
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lacking practical consistency.18 If, contrary to these critical suggestions,
the recent progressive-property accounts do provide a level of substantial
consensus capable of both implementation in legal regimes and cohesion
in future academic debates,19 then they should be able to provide
relatively consistent and predictable answers in most situations to the
following related questions. First, to what extent can specific property
regimes be justified in both absolute and relative terms on the basis of
the values identified by the recent progressive-property accounts?
Second, if conflicts arise between regimes that are based on the sorts of
norms and values defended in recent progressive-property accounts, how
should these conflicts be resolved?
This Article tests the new progressive-property approach on exactly
these grounds. Part II reviews the recent progressive-property accounts,
focusing both on their common themes and on the various criticisms they
have engendered. Part III then explains how both Section 8 and rent
control fit the descriptive components of the new progressive-property
accounts, and why considering whether they are good examples of the
new progressive property is useful.
Part IV of the Article begins by examining the conflict between
Section 8 and local rent-control ordinances highlighted by recent
litigation. Part IV then examines what light this conflict sheds on both the
descriptive story and the prescriptive recommendations of the new
progressive property. In particular, I suggest that the most basic tools
from what many recent progressive accounts refer to generally as “lawand-economics theory,” “law-and-economics analysis,” or the “law-andeconomics approach” to property20 have important, even necessary,
18. E.g., Smith, supra note 6, at 960.
19. Cf. id. (noting that “[i]t is hard to be against human flourishing, and a concept that is in
one form or another central to Aristotle, Aquinas, Catholic social thought, modern virtue ethics,
some forms of natural law, and the capabilities approach . . . but one can question the degree of
consensus required for implementation in a legal regime”).
20. For examples of this collective treatment, see, for example, Alexander, The SocialObligation Norm, supra note 5, at 750 (noting that “[i]n recent years, law-and-economics analysis
has dominated property scholarship,” and declaring a goal of “offer[ing] an alternative to that mode
of analyzing property disputes,” which, though it “certainly provides important insights into a
remarkably wide range of property issues,” suffers from limited vision and an impoverished analysis
of moral values and moral issues) and Peñalver, supra note 7, at 823 (claiming that his aim is not to
discredit law-and-economics analysis of property theory across the board, “but merely to explore
several problems raised for the operation of law and economics within the discrete area of land-use
scholarship”). For a more thorough discussion of the treatment of “law-and-economics analysis” in
recent progressive-property accounts, see infra Part II, and especially notes 53–62 and
accompanying text. Using the term “law and economics” as such an umbrella term, as it is used in
recent progressive-property accounts, is deliberately imprecise, blurring long-standing and critical
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roles to play in the new progressive property. More specifically, I claim
that the most basic tools from these law-and-economics approaches to
property are important, even within a progressive-property framework,
to predict and respond to conflicts between property regimes based on
progressive-property norms. In so doing, I help resolve the previously
ambiguous role of these tools within a progressive-property framework.
As a related point, I argue that the use of these tools may also be
necessary to ensure that progressive-property regimes encourage rather
than distort the kinds of behavior that many recent progressive-property
accounts aim to inculcate. In addition, I suggest that the conflict between
Section 8 and rent control can be attributed, in part, to inconsistencies in
the ways that these programs balance and promote some of the plural
values identified by recent progressive-property accounts. Balancing such
plural values is a key characteristic of the new progressive property, and
I argue that Section 8 provides a better example of this balancing
approach than rent control. Finally, at each step this Article attempts to
address one of the “vexing problems” already identified by some
progressive theorists21: namely, what reasoning processes should be used
to balance the incommensurable values that undergird the new
progressive property?
II. A REVIEW OF RECENT PROGRESSIVE-PROPERTY ACCOUNTS
To begin, it is necessary to provide a brief introduction to the general
picture of progressive property that emerges from recent accounts. The
degree of consensus among recent progressive-property accounts is, as
noted above, an open issue, but several common traits can be
identified.22 After summarizing these traits, I will examine each in more
differences between radically different descriptive and prescriptive accounts in an attempt to focus
on a few common themes and techniques. Of course, the authors of recent progressive-property
accounts are well aware of this and use the umbrella term advisedly. See, e.g., Alexander, The SocialObligation Norm, supra note 5, at 748–49 n.8 (noting that he uses “the terms ‘law and economics’
and ‘the law-and-economics tradition’ to embrace all normative positions that evaluate alternative
possible legal regimes by reference to some scalar metric, be it ‘welfare,’ ‘wealth,’ ‘utility,’
‘preference,’ or some cognate metric”). In this Article, I simply follow this same terminological
usage of these progressive-property accounts. When I discuss the “basic law-and-economics tools”
that, I argue, should be incorporated to progressive-property accounts in specific ways, I refer in this
Article to basic considerations of overall efficiency and assumptions about the economic incentives
facing various actors, see infra note 63, while recognizing that other elaborate tools from the lawand-economics approach may also have a place in a progressive-property framework, see infra note
64.
21. Alexander, Pluralism and Property, supra note 6.
22. The summary of the new progressive property in this Section is based largely on the
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detail. First, the new progressive property is characterized by its deeply
communitarian nature23—by its claims that property law should seek to
improve the character of the social relationships and the health of the
communities from which it emerges.24 Second, the recent progressiveproperty accounts tend to be hostile towards absolutist or libertarian
conceptions of private property, favoring instead an approach that takes
into account a wider range of values that private property arguably
serves.25 Third, most recent progressive-property accounts also tend to
express skepticism about descriptions and prescriptions of property law
that are rooted largely in analysis of economic incentives and

following three types of sources: First, this summary is based on the recent “Statement of
Progressive Property” in the Cornell Law Review. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive
Property, supra note 4. Second, this summary is based on related pieces by the signatories to that
Statement. See, e.g., UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 4; Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra
note 5; Peñalver, supra note 7; Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free
and Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009 (2009). Third, this summary is based on those
other works whose close resemblance to these accounts has elsewhere been expressly noted. See,
e.g., Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 5, at 748 n.7 (collecting examples of other
accounts “that bear a family resemblance to the social-obligation theory developed in this Article,”
most of which are referred to in this Article below).
23. For an example of the generally communitarian nature of recent progressive-property
accounts, see, for example, Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, supra note 4, at
744 (“Property enables and shapes community life. Property law . . . can render relationships within
communities either exploitative and humiliating or liberating and ennobling . . . [and] should
establish the framework for a kind of social life appropriate to a free and democratic society.”). Of
course, the label “communitarian” is a loaded one, which is often applied more frequently as an
epithet by critics than a badge of identification. E.g., Daniel Bell, in Communitarianism, in THE
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2010), available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/communitarianism/. This general communitarian trait is not
equally prominent in all recent progressive-property accounts; however, the general characteristic is
common to most, and the specific term has been at least tentatively adopted by some of these
accounts. See, e.g., Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 5, at 786 (suggesting
opportunities for courts “to act in creative and socially transformative ways, reaching decisions on
the basis of the thick communitarian social-obligation norm” defended elsewhere in his article)
(emphasis added). In claiming that the recent progressive-property accounts are generally
“communitarian,” I mean only that they tend to place greater relative importance on social context,
social relationships, and the health of the community than the alternative theoretical approaches
that they criticize, and that they tend to make normative claims based on the value of community
itself and an individual’s relation to the community more often than these same alternative
theoretical approaches. See Singer, supra note 22, at 1035 (noting that “[w]hile efficiency analysis
focuses on satisfying individual interests, Alexander’s more communitarian and dignity-based
approach assumes that we have obligations to others in our community and to those with whom we
form relationships”); cf., e.g., Bell, supra (identifying different strands of communitarian thought,
including “methodological claims about the importance of tradition and social context for moral and
political reasoning” and “normative claims about the value of community”).
24. See infra notes 31–37 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 39–51 and accompanying text.
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motivations.26 At the same time, most of the recent progressive accounts
agree that this law-and-economics approach is ascendant in
contemporary property scholarship.27 Fourth, in place of a focus on
maximizing economic efficiency or preserving the negative freedom of
landowners, almost all recent progressive-property accounts assert that
property law should incorporate alternative systems of values. More
specifically, recent progressive-property accounts often invoke human
flourishing as the proper end at which property rules should aim,28 and
some progressive-property accounts suggest that systems of virtue ethics
might provide a useful means for property law to reach this end.29 As a
result, scholars writing from the perspective of the new progressive
property often display a relatively greater tolerance for property regimes
that produce inefficiencies or infringe upon individual property rights, so
long as those regimes also serve certain other positive values identified
26. See infra notes 53–62 and accompanying text.
27. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 65–71 and accompanying text. By invoking “flourishing” or similar
concepts, even those recent progressive-property accounts that do not expressly refer to systems of
virtue ethics seek to appropriate a normative alternative to the norms that support the law-andeconomics and libertarian approaches to property theory. See, e.g., Peñalver, supra note 7, at 864
(noting that “[u]nlike both utilitarian consequentialism and deontological libertarianism, virtuebased ethical theories in the Aristotelian tradition adopt an agent-centered approach to determining
right action” that “[d]raw on a substantive conception of the human good or flourishing”). By
“flourishing,” these accounts refer expressly or implicitly to a concept that can be traced back to
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, where the concept is defined as the ultimate end of human action,
pursued for its own sake, complete and self-sufficient, the presence of which makes life desirable
and lacking in nothing. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE I.1.1094a1-3,
I.2.1094a19-20, I.7.1097a24-33, 1097b6-21. (Sir David Ross trans.). For a useful short summary of
the various alternative translations of the original term eudaimonia, see, for example, Christopher
Shields, Aristotle, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2011),
available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/aristotle/ (gathering sources and
noting the dispute as to whether the term eudaimonia is best translated as “flourishing,” or
“happiness,” or “living well,” or simply transliterated and left untranslated).
29. By invoking “virtue ethics,” some recent progressive accounts invoke specific ethical
systems that are aimed at this ultimate goal of human flourishing. See, e.g., Peñalver, supra note 7, at
864 (gathering sources and noting that “[v]irtues are acquired, stable dispositions to engage in
certain characteristic modes of behavior that are conducive to human flourishing”). Even systems of
virtue ethics that are deliberately removed from Aristotelian roots tend to revolve around this
central concept of flourishing. See, e.g., Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, in THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2010), available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/archivs/win2010/entries/ethics-virtue/ (noting that “[t]he concept of
eudaimonia . . . is central to any modern neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics and usually employed even by
virtue ethicists who deliberately divorce themselves from Aristotle”). For a more fulsome discussion
of related ethical systems in the context of recent progressive-property accounts, see, for example,
Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 5, at 760–72; Peñalver, supra note 7, at 864–
69.
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by recent progressive-property accounts.30

A. The Communitarian Nature of the New Progressive Property
The most common characteristic of recent progressive-property
accounts, and arguably the most significant, is their communitarian focus
on the ways in which property law can and should shape social life and
relationships between individuals.31 At the most basic level, the
communitarian focus of the new progressive-property approach can be
seen in its claim that property rules affect both individual property
owners and the larger community, and the related suggestion that
property law should account for this larger community interest in
addition to the interests of individual owners.32 Perhaps more
importantly, recent progressive-property accounts suggest that property
law must focus on the nature of the community because its subject
matter is uniquely and inseparably tied to the health of both the
community and its individual members.33
In other words, according to recent progressive-property accounts,
property law is uniquely intertwined with the broader community from
which it springs—so much so that it is impossible to truly understand
property without reference to the broader community that gives it
meaning.34 This communitarian focus has a practical bite: if property

30. See infra notes 69–71 and accompanying text. As a practical example of this common
trait, one recent progressive-property account cites the nondiscrimination mandate placed on
private owners of places of public accommodation in Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See id.
31. See, e.g., Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, supra note 4, at 744
(“Property enables and shapes community life. Property law can render relationships within
communities either exploitative and humiliating or liberating and ennobling. Property law should
establish the framework for a kind of social life appropriate to a free and democratic society.”); see
also Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 5, at 751 (noting that a conception of the
social-obligation norm that “links ownership’s social obligation with the idea of community . . . is
the conception that I wish to examine most closely here”).
32. See, e.g., ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
COMMON GOOD 15–16 (2003) (claiming that “[m]any times, how property is employed also affects
the surrounding community—socially, economically, and ecologically—so the community and its
interests must be taken into account”).
33. See, e.g., Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 5, at 766 (noting that
“[c]ommunities, including but not limited to the state, are the mediating vehicles through which we
come to acquire the resources we need to flourish and to become fully socialized into the exercise of
our capabilities”).
34. See Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 5, at 749 (arguing that what “is
socially cognizable as property is only that form of access to resources that is consistent with human
flourishing and community itself”); Purdy, supra note 4, at 1243, 1298 (arguing that property is “a
social institution” because “property regimes set the terms on which people are able to recruit each
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law is uniquely related to the health and well-being of the community, it
should reflect a substantial concern for community interests; and
individual private property rights should perhaps receive less protection
than the individual rights protected by other areas of the law.35 More
specifically, some recent progressive-property accounts argue that
individual property claims deserve less protection than, for example,
individual claims to artistic or political self-expression because of the
uniquely communitarian nature of property law.36 However, progressive
accounts also tend to argue that much of contemporary property law fails
to incorporate these practical communitarian insights, reflecting instead
an undue concern for individual interests at the expense of the
community.37
B. Individual Property Rights and the New Progressive Property
Given their conclusion that property law and theory should be
reoriented toward neglected plural and communitarian values,38 most
recent progressive-property theorists reject what they call absolutist39 or

other for social cooperation”); Singer, supra note 22, at 1049 (claiming that “[w]e cannot
understand property law without understanding the social relationships it embodies and
promotes”).
35. See, e.g., UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 4, at 127 (arguing that private property rights are
and should be “protected less” than individual rights in other areas of the law because they
“involve[], far less often, the uniquely powerful normative claims that justify the ‘trumping’ or
presumptive power of” of other types of individual rights); David Lametti, The Objects of Virtue, in
PROPERTY AND COMMUNITY 35–36 (Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, eds., 2010)
(noting that “[t]he objects of property relations, contextually understood and valued, therefore,
become a specific point of entry for the community’s imposition of values in property discourse”).
36. See, e.g., UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 4, at 127 (noting that “because property claims so
often involve . . . interdependent claims or allocational claims[,] the normative power of the values
that these claimed rights assert is much more frequently matched by the normative power of the
competing public interests than is true in other contexts. . . . [T]his is a routine occurrence in
property cases”); Lametti, supra note 35, at 36 (suggesting that in the future, “land use will be
increasingly subject to this communal concern, and the number of restrictions that reflect this
dimension of ‘public in use’ will increase or become more explicit”).
37. See, e.g., FREYFOGLE, supra note 32, at 252 (claiming that “[a]s commonly understood
today in the United States, private property stands starkly opposed to holistic, ecological goals such
as land health,” in part because “the main strands of contemporary ownership came together at a
time when the liberated entrepreneur, not the healthy community, was the symbol of progress”).
38. See, e.g., Alexander, Pluralism and Property, supra note 6, at 1017, 1035–51 (arguing in
support of a social obligation approach to property that is based on incommensurable plural
values).
39. See, e.g., Kevin Gray, Land Law and Human Rights, in LAND LAW: ISSUES, DEBATES,
POLICY 211, 222–23 (Louise Tee ed., 2002) (claiming that “[i]n most areas of property law there
exists a tension between . . . the perspectives of the property absolutist and the property relativist,”
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libertarian40 approaches to property law—approaches that, according to
these recent progressive accounts, tend to unduly privilege individual
property interests at the expense of the community.41 This theoretical
rejection has practical significance,42 because it leads to a relatively
broad tolerance for infringing upon individual property claims to serve
communitarian or other values.43 For example, although many believe
that an individual landowner’s right to exclude is the theoretical core of
property,44 many new progressive accounts claim that this right is and
should be compromised in the service of broader social obligations.45
Compared to other property theories, therefore, recent progressive
accounts suggest that such negative, individual property rights can
relatively frequently be trumped, particularly when they conflict with the
new progressive property’s commitment to values such as human dignity
and development,46 distributive justice and equitable distribution of
and suggesting that property absolutists “tend . . . [to] maintain that all regulatory interference with
land use necessarily constitutes a compensable ‘taking’ of property”).
40. See, e.g., UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 4, at 159 (claiming that the American “tradition of
‘negative’ constitutional rights, and our firm inclusion of property among those rights,” reflects an
aspiration “toward a system characterized by ‘free-market, minimalist-state libertarianism,’” which
reinforces the incorrect and impractical “notion that property is . . . defined by private law and
insulated (by constitutional guarantee) from otherwise legitimate public demands”).
41. See, e.g., Peñalver, supra note 7, at 861 (noting that the absolutist “libertarian position
that respect for individual property rights is all that matters, consequences be damned, is neither
appealing nor workable” nor, ultimately, “acceptable even to its own practitioners”).
42. Some recent progressive accounts acknowledge that this figure of the absolutist
private-property enthusiast, against whom the new progressive-property approach is partially drawn,
is something of a bogeyman. See, e.g., Gray, supra note 39, at 222–23 (noting that “[t]here remain
today few true property absolutists”). Nevertheless, the opposition of recent progressive-property
accounts to the absolutist or deeply libertarian approach is significant, because it reflects a relatively
broad tolerance in the new progressive property for compromising individual property claims. See
id. at 240 (noting that the debate between absolutist and relativist theories of property impacts
crucially important views “of the political balance to be maintained between individual and
community interests”).
43. See, e.g., Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, supra note 4, at 744
(claiming that the pursuit of the values identified by the new progressive property requires
“attentiveness to the effects of claiming and exercising property rights on others, including future
generations, and on the natural environment and the non-human world”).
44. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730,
730 (1998) (arguing “that the right to exclude others is more than just ‘one of the most essential’
constituents of property—it is the sine qua non”).
45. See, e.g., Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 5, at 747–48 (claiming that
“[t]he core image of property rights . . . [in which] the owner has a right to exclude others and owes
no further obligation” is misleading, and stating that the purpose of his progressive account is to
draw attention to the social obligations of owners at the expense of individual rights such as the
right to exclude).
46. See id. at 748, 768 (claiming that his “version of the social-obligation norm” is superior
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resources,47 and other traditionally underexamined rights and goods.48
As a result, the new progressive-property approach tends to favor
specific property regimes and policies such as restrictions on the terms
and the marketing of home mortgages for low-income borrowers;49
expansive interpretations of the public trust doctrine;50 and local rentcontrol ordinances,51 which this Article examines in some detail.52
C. The Contrast Between the New Progressive-Property and the
Law-and-Economics Approaches
In addition to their opposition toward libertarian approaches, most
recent progressive-property accounts are skeptical about an approach to
property law that they refer to as the “law-and-economics approach,”
which they characterize as based largely on the analysis and projection of
overall efficiency as expressed by contemporary market values.53 Most of
the recent progressive accounts agree that the law-and-economics
approach dominates the contemporary academic analysis of property

because it “enables individuals to live lives worthy of human dignity,” and further claiming that “[a]s
a matter of human dignity, every person is equally entitled to flourish”).
47. See Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, supra note 4, at 744 (“Because
of the equal value of each human being, property laws should promote the ability of each person to
obtain the material resources necessary for full social and political participation.”); see also
Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 5, at 771–72 (arguing that “[w]e must protect
important values like fairness . . . even as we recognize that community membership involves the
possibility of unreciprocated sacrifices”); Peñalver, supra note 7, at 880 (noting that “[i]n contrast”
to utilitarian property theories, “the plural values recognized by the virtue theory of land pushes its
commitment to redistribution in more complex and expansive directions”).
48. See, e.g., Gray, supra note 39, at 211–12 (arguing that although”[l]and law and human
rights have never seemed particularly natural bedfellows,” property law should more openly
confront the wide range of value judgments it currently “silently betrays” regarding “the ‘proper’
entitlements of human and other actors”).
49. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 22, at 1060–61 (suggesting that the regulations governing
home mortgage loans should be reformed to prevent various sales tactics and to discourage financial
institutions from making loans to certain borrowers).
50. See, e.g., Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 5, at 805 (outlining the ways
in which “[a] human flourishing-focused social-obligation theorist might attempt to justify the
expansion of public access to privately-owned beaches”).
51. See, e.g., Peñalver, supra note 7, at 882–83 (suggesting that rent control and evictionprotection statutes may be an example of attempts by the law to protect crucially important dignitary
interests representative of the flourishing-centered approach to property law he endorses).
52. See infra Part III.B.
53. See, e.g., Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 5, at 748 n.8 (noting that he
uses the terms “law and economics” and “the law-and-economics tradition” as umbrella terms “to
embrace all normative positions that evaluate alternative possible legal regimes” by referring to
“wealth” or other cognate scalar metrics).
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law.54 At the same time, however, they also tend to argue that the lawand-economics approach should be replaced by, or at least supplemented
with, a new theoretical system that takes into account the true
communitarian nature of property and the other important values that
property law should reflect.55
Still, it would be inaccurate to claim that recent progressive-property
accounts have rejected the law-and-economics approach wholesale.56
Rather, what many recent progressive accounts criticize in the law-andeconomics approach is the single-minded focus on market values as well
as the tendency to give arguably unsupported, normative weight to
economic analysis and economic models.57 In place of a single-minded
focus on efficiency and market values, the recent progressive-property
accounts tend to seek a new approach that retains a place in property
theory for such law-and-economics analysis—albeit a place that is properly
cabined and that serves the plural norms they have identified as the
proper foundation for a theoretical analysis of property law.58

54. See, e.g., id. at 745 (stating, as an overarching goal of his article, the desire “to provide in
property legal theory an alternative to law-and-economics theory, the dominant mode of theorizing
about property in contemporary scholarship”); Peñalver, supra note 7, at 822 (noting that [“[l]aw
and economics dominates contemporary legal academic discussions of the ownership and use of
land.”)
55. See, e.g., Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 5, at 819 (arguing that
“[t]he time has come . . . . [to] end the virtual hegemony of law-and-economics analysis in property
theory,” which fails to “provide a satisfactory account of many of the obligations that courts have
imposed on property owners” and which is based upon a “moral dimension [that] is too anemic to
do justice to the values that inhere in [property] obligations, values that notably include human
flourishing”); see also FREYFOGLE, supra note 32, at 201 (arguing that “the market is no simple tool
to use to achieve healthy lands and communities,” which “can come only from public policies that
have as their aim not the promotion of markets but something far different”); Singer, supra note 22,
at 1053 (arguing that “[a]lthough economic analysis of property rights appears to be the dominant
approach in law schools these days, the utilitarian moral theory on which it is based is . . . fatally
flawed—at least unless it is supplemented or cabined by normative analyses of other kinds, such as
considerations of justice, fairness, obligations, and ethics”).
56. See, e.g., Peñalver, supra note 7, at 823 (“I aim not to discredit . . . [law-and-economics]
analysis across the board, but merely to explore several problems raised for the operation of law
and economics within the discrete area of land-use scholarship.”).
57. See id. at 823–24 (noting that the particular focus of his progressive-property account is
“first, on some legal economists’ over-reliance on land’s market value and owners’ incentives to
maximize market returns in crafting their positive models of landowner behavior, and, second, on
highlighting what I see as the limited normative significance of economists’ positive findings”).
58. See, e.g., FREYFOGLE, supra note 32, at 187 (claiming that “[t]he market train, in truth, is
less new and less powerful than its advocates claim,” and that it “needs a human engineer . . . able
to think clearly and talk sensibly about where the train ought to head,” but that under these terms,
market analysis “can be a potent tool . . . if it is well embedded in a communal order and in a sound
ethical and ecological view of the human place in nature”); see also Peñalver, supra note 7, at 823
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Indeed, some recent progressive accounts conclude that
sophisticated forms of economic analysis, especially those incorporating
behavioral and psychological insights, may play a significant role within a
progressive framework.59 The real targets of these recent progressive
accounts are those law-and-economics analyses of property that employ
straightforward, rational-actor models of landowner behavior as
determined, in large part, by basic economic incentives and an assumed
desire to maximize market returns.60 The prospect of preserving a place
for efficiency-based analysis while serving norms and values unique to
property law provides much of the appeal and promise of the recent
progressive-property accounts: these accounts suggest the possibility of a
useful synthesis between the law-and-economics approach and many
norms and values that have often been defined as incompatible with it.61
To date, however, this promise has not been entirely fulfilled because the
proper role and scope of efficiency analysis within the new progressiveproperty approach remains somewhat ambiguous.62 To begin resolving

(“My goal . . . is twofold. First, I aim to explore some of the limitations of law-and-economics
analysis of land-use questions. Second, I begin to lay the groundwork for an approach rooted in the
Aristotelian tradition of virtue ethics, one that is able to incorporate the insights of economic
analysis without succumbing to the tendency to treat efficiency as the only relevant normative
consideration.”).
59. See, e.g., Peñalver, supra note 7, at 824, 873 (noting that the “exploration of the
descriptive and prescriptive problems with the economic property theories I am discussing” does
not “reach these more sophisticated behavioral approaches,” and claiming that “sophisticated and
empirically grounded positive economic analysis (as well as empirical analysis from within other
social science disciplines) will have a great deal of value” within a progressive-property framework).
60. See, e.g., id. at 824 (“I intend to focus my descriptive critique on the subset of ‘law and
economics’ accounts of land ownership that continue to employ a rational-actor model of landowner
behavior.”).
61. See, e.g., id. at 863 (claiming that “[t]he challenge for property and land-use theorists is
to find a way to put the valuable tools of economic analysis to use while restricting the normative
ambition of those tools to their proper domain”).
62. See infra Parts III.A, III.B, and IV.B. The ambiguity of the proper place for efficiency
analysis within the larger framework of progressive-property theory is due in part simply to the
novelty of the recent progressive-property accounts, and the resolution of this ambiguity is one of
the ends of this Article. At the same time, a measure of ambiguity regarding the role of law-andeconomics analysis is simply an irreducible feature of the new progressive property, marked as it is
by a plurality of values and a rejection of narrow scalar analysis. See, e.g., Alexander, The SocialObligation Norm, supra note 5, at 751 (noting that the progressive approach he advocates “candidly
admits that the best we can do is to . . . frankly eschew[] any pretense of precise ex ante
predictions”); see also Peñalver, supra note 7, at 887 (noting that his virtue ethics-based account’s
“plural conception of value raises the obvious question of what to do when two or more values
appear to conflict,” and that while “[l]egal economists . . . resolve these apparent conflicts” by
reduction “to a single metric of preference satisfaction” followed by “cost-benefit analysis” on that
metric, the approach he advocates “does not aim at generating an ‘algorithm for life independent of
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this ambiguity, I suggest that even the most basic tools from a law-andeconomics analysis of property—those which assume that landowners will
attempt to maximize the present market value of their land and which
examine the economic incentives that such landowners then face63—have
important roles to play within a progressive-property framework.64
D. The Role of Virtue Ethics Within the New Progressive Property
Recent progressive accounts advance a plurality of diverse and
underexamined values, such as human dignity and development, an
equitable distribution of resources, and other traditionally underexamined values, as a new guide for property law and theory.65 At the
same time, they also offer a remarkably consistent, overall normative
framework to organize and interpret these diverse values.66 In place of
an exclusive focus on maximizing economic efficiency or preserving the
negative freedom of landowners, most of the recent progressive-property
judgment’”) (quoting ROASALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS 54 (1999) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). While the inherent ambiguity of the role of law-and-economics tools within a
progressive-property framework may never be entirely resolved, I argue that it can and should be
minimized if the basic tools of law-and-economics analysis are incorporated within a larger
progressive-property framework, along the lines argued for below. See infra Part IV.B.
63. For a paradigmatic example, see, for example, Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of
Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 354–58 (1967). For a criticism of the so-called
“Demsetzian” position from a recent progressive-property account, see, for example, Peñalver,
supra note 7, at 825–26 (labeling “discussions of the incentives that land’s market value generates
for wealth-maximizing landowners” the “Demsetzian” or “investment model of landowner
behavior”) (quoting Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles,
Investments and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309 (2006)). Recent progressiveproperty accounts criticize both the “descriptive” aspect of the Demsetzian model, which asserts
that private owners predictably act in ways that maximize market returns from their land, and its
“normative” dimension, which concludes that the decision making of private owners is superior to
the product of public deliberation. See, e.g., Peñalver, supra note 7, at 824–26 (“I intend to focus
my descriptive critique on the subset of ‘law and economics’ accounts . . . that continue to employ a
rational-actor model of landowner behavior.”). Below I argue that the basic tools and assumptions
of the descriptive component of this Demsetzian approach have a role to play even within a
progressive-property framework. See infra Part IV.B. I make no claims regarding its normative
dimension.
64. I do not deny that more sophisticated tools from behavioral law-and-economics analysis
have significant, perhaps even more important, roles to play within a progressive-property
framework than the “basic” descriptive approach considered here. I argue only that basic law-andeconomics tools also have an important role to play within a progressive-property framework. See
supra note 64 and infra Part IV.B.
65. See supra notes 46–48.
66. See, e.g., Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 5, at 818 (claiming that
“property law is not solely about either individual freedom or cost-minimization” but “also about
human flourishing and supporting the communities that enable us to live well-lived lives”).
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accounts consistently suggest that property law should be reoriented
toward normative systems based on human flourishing67 to fully account
for the diverse values that property ought to embody.
In place of welfare-maximizing approaches to property, many
progressive accounts suggest a new theoretical approach, aimed at
promoting human flourishing, and based on Aristotelian systems of
virtue ethics, with three specific goals.68 First, property law properly
subordinated to a system of virtue ethics can provide a set of rules and
obligations that protect relatively disadvantaged members of society,
whose ability to flourish might be harmed by property owners’ immoral
decisions.69 Second, property law can provide a set of rules and
obligations that constrain and correct the behavior of nonvirtuous
property owners so that, over time, they learn to act virtuously of their
own accord.70 Third, property law can provide a set of rules that clarify
social obligations and coordinate collective virtuous actions, both for
individual self-realization and for the broader health of the community.71
In Part III of this Article, I examine all four common traits of the new
progressive-property approach in more detail, including this
incorporation of systems of virtue ethics, to determine whether the
federal Section 8 housing voucher program and rent control meet the
new progressive-property approach’s descriptive characteristics.
67. See, e.g., id. at 761 (noting that “[a]t the core of the Aristotelian tradition is the belief
that a distinctively human life exists toward which all of one’s capabilities should be directed,” and
arguing that property law should encourage actions and dispositions that contribute to living this
distinctively human life); see also FREYFOGLE, supra note 32, at 207–08 (citing previous work by
Joseph William Singer, and arguing that “[p]rivate property promotes individual good to the degree
that it enables individuals to thrive . . . [and] live a ‘fully human life’”); Alexander et al., A Statement
of Progressive Property, supra note 4, at 743 (claiming that “[v]alues promoted by property include
life and human flourishing, the protection of physical security, the ability to acquire knowledge and
make choices, and the freedom to live one’s life on one’s own terms”).
68. E.g., Peñalver, supra note 7, at 871–72; see also Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm,
supra note 5, at 761–62 & nn. 64–67 (invoking Aristotelian systems of virtue ethics as a
normatively distinctive component of the approach to property for which he argues); Lametti, supra
note 35, at 13, 36–37 (concluding that “[v]irtue should dictate how we act with respect to valuable
resources,” and considering potential sources for the necessary system of virtue ethics necessary for
a full understanding of property). Under a progressive-property approach, whether all or any of
these goals should be pursued is a prudential and context-dependent issue, as are the relative
weights that should be assigned to each.
69. Peñalver, supra note 7, at 871.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 872. Peñalver suggests that Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is one example
of such a virtue-based property regime. Despite initial criticism, Title II has largely succeeded in
reshaping individual and community attitudes while protecting disadvantaged members of society
from discrimination by non-virtuous individual property owners. Id. at 871–72.
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III. SECTION 8 AND RENT CONTROL AS EXAMPLES OF THE NEW
PROGRESSIVE PROPERTY

Viewed together, the various accounts characterized here and
elsewhere as the new progressive property comprise a broad and diverse
doctrine. Indeed, some have argued that the wide range of values
endorsed by recent progressive-property accounts undermines their
practical significance.72 At the same time, however, this diversity is a
fundamental characteristic of these new progressive-property accounts,
based on the claim that property implicates plural and incommensurable
values.73 The plural values endorsed by recent progressive-property
accounts make their boundaries somewhat unclear, and commentators
have already begun to try to determine whether a particular property
regime should be considered “progressive property.”74
In this Part, despite the inherent ambiguities involved in defining the
borders of accounts consciously built around plural values, I argue that
both the federal Section 8 housing voucher program and many local rentcontrol ordinances merit consideration as potential examples of the new
progressive property. Rent control has previously been identified as a
practical example of the values and ends endorsed by the new
progressive property,75 and I examine this identification in more detail
below. I also argue that Section 8 is a good example of a progressiveproperty approach in practice. More specifically, as I conclude below,
Section 8 fits the values and ends of the new progressive-property
approach better than rent control, even though Section 8, unlike rent
control, has not previously been identified as a practical example of the
new progressive-property approach.76

72. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 6, at 960 (“It is hard to be against human flourishing, and a
concept that is in one form or another central to Aristotle, Aquinas, Catholic social thought, modern
virtue ethics, some forms of natural law, and the capabilities approach . . . but one can question the
degree of consensus required for implementation in a legal regime.”).
73. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, supra note 4, at 743.
74. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 5, at 69–71 (suggesting that some community land trusts
provide a way to practically realize the values and ends advanced by these accounts).
75. See, e.g., Peñalver, supra note 7, at 882–83 (suggesting that local rent and eviction
control ordinances may be an example of property law’s attempts to protect crucially important
dignitary interests and long-standing bonds that land users form with land, which are representative
of the flourishing-centered approach to property law he endorses).
76. See infra Parts III.A, III.B, and IV.B.
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A. Section 8 as an Example of the New Progressive Property
Since the Great Depression, the federal government has advanced an
enormous number of federal programs designed to improve housing for
low-income Americans, each of which has typically undergone several
changes in substance and title.77 What this Article refers to for the sake
of simplicity as the federal Section 8 housing voucher program is no
exception. In using the term “federal Section 8 housing voucher
program,” this Article refers to the broad program of federal tenantbased assistance for low-income households to obtain rental housing in
the private housing market; this program began in earnest in 1974, when
Congress amended the Housing Act of 1937 by passing the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974.78
Even a relatively brief description of the Section 8 housing voucher
program must include a bit of context about some of the other types of
federal housing assistance from which Section 8 sprung, beginning with
the creation of the first substantial federal housing programs in the
Housing Act of 1937.79 Under the public housing program created by the
Housing Act of 1937, government funds were used to create public,
government-owned housing for low-income households.80 Federal funds
were used for the initial-development costs of the public-housing
facilities, while local funds and local public-housing authorities, or
“PHAs,” paid for and supervised the facilities’ subsequent

77. E.g., Edgar O. Olsen, Housing Programs for Low-Income Households, in MEANS-TESTED
TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 365 (Robert A. Moffitt, ed., 2003).
78. See Public L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 662 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (2006)) (adding
Section 8 to the Housing Act of 1937 for the purpose of “aiding low-income families in obtaining a
decent place to live and of promoting economically mixed housing”). For a brief discussion of the
relationship between Section 8 and predecessor programs, such as the Experimental Housing
Allowance Program, see DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER PROGRAM
GUIDEBOOK,
at
1-2
to
1-3
(2001),
available
at
http://portal.hud.gov:80/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=DOC _35611.pdf/; EDWARD L.
GLAESER & JOSEPH GYOURKO, RETHINKING FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY: HOW TO MAKE HOUSING
PLENTIFUL AND AFFORDABLE 115 (2008). Today, what this Article refers to as “the federal Section 8
housing voucher program,” or simply “Section 8,” is known as the Housing Choice Voucher
Program. For a discussion of the evolution from the Section 8 Existing Housing Program, also
known as the rental-certificate program, to the Housing Choice Voucher Program, see DEP’T OF
HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra, at 1-2 to 1-5. As noted in the text, this Article refers generically to
both the rental-certificate program and the rental-voucher program as “the federal Section 8 housing
voucher program” or “Section 8.”
79. E.g., DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 78, at 1-1.
80. E.g., Olsen, supra note 77, at 370.
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administration.81 In keeping with the Depression-era roots of the
Housing Act of 1937, the public housing program focused on job
creation through the production of new housing projects as well as on
slum clearance and improving housing conditions for low-income
families;82 indeed, some scholars have suggested that this goal of job
creation was so central to these first public housing efforts as to be
necessary for their passage.83 Beginning in the late 1960s, the federal
government began to increase its role in the administration of publichousing projects, by providing additional subsidies to local housing
authorities in exchange for restrictions on the rents that could be charged
to low-income tenants and modernization of the housing units.84 Despite
this expansion, public-housing projects, like all subsequent forms of
federal, low-income housing programs discussed in this section, do not
provide an entitlement to decent housing, with many qualified
households on waiting lists for public housing.85
In addition to the publicly owned, low-income housing projects that
began with the Housing Act of 1937, the federal government began
contracting with private parties to provide low-income housing in

81. Id.; see DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 78, at 1-1 (noting that “[t]he U.S.
Housing Act of 1937 authorized local PHAs established by individual states. The 1937 Act also
initiated the public housing program”).
82. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 78, at 1-1; see also J. Peter Byrne & Michael
Diamond, Affordable Housing, Land Tenure, and Urban Policy: The Matrix Revealed, 34 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 527, 532–33 (2007) (noting that the Public Housing Act of 1937 “was bitterly opposed by
the private real estate industry and prevailed in no small part because it provided construction work
during the Depression”).
83. See, e.g., ALEX F. SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 125 (2d ed.
2010) (suggesting that passage of the Public Housing Act in 1937 “owed nearly as much to public
housing’s potential for employment generation and slum clearance as to its ability to meet the
nation’s need for low-cost housing”).
84. E.g., Olsen, supra note 77, at 370.
85. This, of course, makes low-income housing programs something of an outlier among
means-tested transfer programs. See, e.g., Olsen, supra note 77, at 365 (“Unlike other major meanstested transfers, no low-income housing program is an entitlement for any type of household.”). For
criticism of this aspect of low-income housing programs, see, for example, SCHWARTZ, supra note
83, at 318 (arguing that “[u]nfortunately, unless housing assistance for low-income families becomes
an entitlement—just as tax benefits are for homeowners—the nation’s housing problems will
persist”). With respect to Section 8, for which demand for assistance generally outstrips the supply
determined by present funding levels, this means that in most places there are lengthy waitlists of
otherwise-qualified tenants who are not served by the program. Byrne & Diamond, supra note 82, at
605. For example, the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (“HACLA”), which administers
Section 8 vouchers to over 45,000 households, has a waitlist of several thousand households.
HOUS. AUTH. OF THE CITY OF L.A., FACT SHEET 1–2 (2009), available at http://www.hacla.org/
attachments/wysiwyg/10/FactSheet_2009_091809.pdf .
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1954.86 These privately owned and federally subsidized projects for lowincome housing can be understood as a separate category of federal
programs to address problems related to low-income housing.87 In
general, under the terms of most of these programs, and in exchange for
federal subsidies, private developers agree to build or rehabilitate
housing to conform to federal standards. The private developers then
agree to provide this new or rehabilitated housing primarily or
exclusively to households that meet certain income characteristics for a
specified term of years.88 Today, privately owned, subsidized-housing
projects have become a larger source of new housing aid than publicly
owned projects.89
Until the creation of the federal Section 8 housing voucher
program’s forerunners in the mid-1960s, almost all federal programs for
low-income housing were “project based,” whether those projects were
publicly or privately owned.90 Section 8 and its forerunners, therefore,
represent a third and different type of low-income housing program—one
tied to specific qualifying households or tenants rather than specific
housing projects.91 In other words, and in contrast to the project-based
86. Olsen, supra note 77, at 371–72. The federal government’s efforts to directly contract
with private parties to provide housing for low-income households began with HUD’s Section
221(d)(3) Market Interest Rate Program. Id.
87. JOHN C. WEICHER, PRIVATIZING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING 3 (1997) (describing “the three
major categories of subsidized housing programs: public housing, privately owned projects, and
vouchers and certificates for use in privately owned housing”).
88. Olsen, supra note 77, at 371. Today, the largest program of federally subsidized and
privately owned housing projects for low-income households is the Section 8 New
Construction/Substantial Rehabilitation Program, which was created in 1974 along with the Section
8 housing voucher program that is analyzed in this Article. Id. at 372–73. In addition to the
subsidies for the construction or rehabilitation of privately owned low-income housing projects it
provides, under the Section 8 New Construction/Substantial Rehabilitation Program, as under the
Section 8 housing voucher program, federal funds are used to provide rental assistance payments
that reduce the rents paid by tenants in the subsidized building to a portion of the tenants’ adjusted
incomes. Id. Despite this similarity, all references to “Section 8” in the remainder of the Article,
unless otherwise specified, are to the tenant-based Section 8 housing voucher program, and not to
the project-based subsidies of the Section 8 New Construction/Substantial Rehabilitation Program.
89. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, The False Promise of the Mixed-Income Housing Project, 57
UCLA L. REV. 983, 990 (2010) (noting that the various private-owner, and project-based federal
subsidy programs, rather than public housing projects, are now the major source of new projectbased federal aid).
90. Olsen, supra note 77, at 374–75. However, tenant-based programs similar in nature to
the Section 8 housing voucher program had been proposed in legislative debates reaching back to
the Public Housing Act of 1937. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, supra note 83, at 177 (noting general
backdrop of early attempts to establish housing voucher programs prior to the 1970s).
91. SCHWARTZ, supra note 83, at 177; see also WEICHER, supra note 87, at 5 (noting that
“[h]ousing certificates and vouchers are the third type of subsidy program, with a basic subsidy
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programs, Section 8 is a “tenant-based” program: it provides federal
subsidies made available through local PHAs for tenants’ use on the
private-housing market, wherever those tenants may choose to live.
More specifically, under the Section 8 program, local PHAs set
payment standards at fixed levels, targeted around local Fair Market Rent
levels, or “FMRs.”92 Total tenant payment levels for qualifying lowincome households are set according to a formula that accounts for
various local standards and tenant income, with tenants generally
responsible for a portion of the rent out of their own adjusted net
income.93 Tenants are also responsible for finding an apartment that
meets the rent and physical standards of the program and is owned by a
landlord willing to participate.94 Landlords may apply for rent increases
on units inhabited by tenants in the program, with desired rent increases
approved or denied by local PHAs on the basis of a reasonableness
test.95 Unlike project-based programs, the Section 8 housing voucher
program is not designed to increase the supply of affordable housing—
instead, the program relies on low-income households finding acceptable
units from existing housing stock.96
In further contrast to project-based federal housing programs, lowincome tenants participating in the Section 8 housing voucher program
are not tied to a particular place, which means assisted tenants can
theoretically be dispersed throughout the community—or at least
dispersed at rates greater than under project-based programs.97
Moreover, in theory, if not always in practice, the vouchers under this

mechanism very different from the project-based subsidies described above”).
92. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 78, at 1-6.
93. Id. (noting that total tenant payments under the program are “the greater of: 30% of
adjusted income, 10% of gross income, the welfare rent (in as-paid states only), or the PHA
minimum rent. If the family chooses a unit with a gross rent that exceeds the payment standard, the
family pays the TTP plus the amount by which the gross rent exceeds the payment standard.”). Total
tenant payments are capped at a portion of the total rent generally not in excess of 40% of the total.
Id.
94. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, supra note 83, at 177–78 (noting that “[t]o qualify for the voucher
program, a unit must meet certain standards for physical quality and space,” must be available for
the Fair Market Rent covered by the vouchers available and the low-income tenant’s qualifying
income, and must be owned by a landlord who agrees “to physical inspections, to complete the
necessary paperwork, and to accept rental subsidy payments from the government”).
95. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 78, at 1-6.
96. Byrne & Diamond, supra note 82, at 605.
97. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 78, at 1-3 (noting that the Section 8 housing
voucher program’s popularity is based in part on its role in “dispers[ing] families throughout the
community and [avoiding] projects or site selection problems”).
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program are portable; this means that once in the program, assisted
tenants can move to new residences, provided they can find a new and
willing landlord and a rental unit that meets the program’s specifications.
Despite the decades-long head start enjoyed by the earliest public
housing projects after the Housing Act of 1937,98 today, the housing
choice voucher program is the largest assisted-housing program
administered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (“HUD”).99 Many commentators ascribe the voucher
program’s creation and rapid rise to disappointment with the other types
of federal housing programs created earlier in the last century.100
Should the federal Section 8 housing voucher program be considered
an example of the new progressive property? In general, and especially
when compared to other types of federal housing programs, the answer
seems to be at least a qualified yes. The broad statutory purposes of
Section 8 are to “aid[] low-income families in obtaining a decent place to
live and . . . promot[e] economically mixed housing.”101 These broad
statutory purposes match up well with the ends described and endorsed
by recent progressive-property accounts. Most obviously, the stated goal
of helping low-income families obtain a decent place to live resonates
strongly with a progressive-property focus on human flourishing; after
all, physical security and the means to live on one’s own terms are the
most basic and essential goods protected by property that promote
human flourishing.102 Moreover, in attempting to secure this most basic
property good for low-income households, Section 8 embodies the new
progressive property’s characteristic concerns for distributive justice, the
98. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, supra note 83, at 180 (noting that “[w]hereas the number of
households in public housing and other project-based subsidy programs has decreased since the
early 1990s, the voucher program has continued to grow, if only in fits and starts”).
99. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 78, at 2-1; see also GLAESER & GYOURKO,
supra note 78, at 103–04 (summarizing HUD data on the number of low-income households
assisted under various federal programs).
100. E.g., GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra note 78, at 115.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (2006).
102. See FREYFOGLE, supra note 32, at 207–08 (arguing that “[p]rivate property promotes
individual good to the degree that it enables individuals to thrive . . . [and] live a ‘fully human life’”);
Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, supra note 4, at 743 (claiming that the proper
“[v]alues promoted by property include life and human flourishing, the protection of physical
security . . . and the freedom to live one’s life on one’s own terms”); Peñalver, supra note 7, at 880
(pointing out that “a person cannot flourish without the ability to occupy some physical space within
which she can carry out activities essential to her existence, such as eating and sleeping”); see also
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS I.3.1253b23-26 (“Property is a part of the household, and the art of acquiring
property is a part of the art of managing the household; for no man can live well, or indeed live at
all, unless he be provided with necessaries.”).
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equitable distribution of resources, and the protection of relatively
disadvantaged members of society.103 In terms of its general purposes,
therefore, Section 8 is an excellent example of the kind of property
program or regime that the new progressive-property approach endorses,
even though it has not previously been so identified by recent
progressive-property accounts.
The close fit between Section 8 and recent progressive-property
accounts becomes even more evident when Section 8 is scrutinized in
more detail and compared to other low-income housing programs at a
similar level of scrutiny. For example, Section 8 focuses on providing
rental housing to low-income families from existing stock.104 Thus,
unlike project-based, low-income housing efforts,105 Section 8 is not
designed to stimulate job growth by building new housing units, a goal
which is at best ancillary106 to the progressive end of providing lowincome families with decent housing.107
Moreover, in requiring assisted low-income families to find their own
housing on the rental market after empowering them with vouchers,
Section 8 is designed to enhance the dignity and autonomy of its
recipients,108 while reducing any social stigma that may attach to visible

103. See supra notes 47, 69, 71 and accompanying text; see also Peñalver, supra note 7, at
880 (claiming that securing basic shelter for the relatively disadvantaged is a key example of the new
progressive property’s commitment “to redistribution in more complex and equitable directions” to
promote human flourishing).
104. See, e.g., Byrne & Diamond, supra note 82, at 605 (noting that the Section 8 housing
voucher program “is not designed to increase the supply of affordable housing, relying on the
voucher recipient finding an acceptable unit from among the existing stock”).
105. For the roots of federal project-based housing programs in Depression-era theories about
building subsidies and job creation, see supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra note 78, at 113 (concluding from various studies
that subsidized housing production through project-based aid actually crowds out private
development at an average net rate of 50%).
107. It might be possible, of course, to argue that the building subsidies inherent in projectbased housing programs also foster progressive-property ends, but the relationship is attenuated at
best, far more so than the connection between Section 8 and the new progressive property.
Moreover, the potential relationship between subsidies for project-based construction and the new
progressive property is further compromised by the environmental and resource demands of such
construction, which fit poorly with the focus of many recent progressive accounts on environmental
and resource conservation. See, e.g., FREYFOGLE, supra note 32, at 223 (claiming that property law
needs to change to meet three critical goals, the first of which must be to promote conservation).
108. See, e.g., Written Testimony of Shaun Donovan, Secretary of U.S. Department of
Housing and Development, before Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, May
5, 2011, at 10 (noting HUD’s priorities and “core belief: when you choose a home—you also choose
transportation to work, schools for your children, and public safety. You choose a community—and
the amenities available in that community”). Testimonials abound regarding the Section 8 housing
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project-based assistance.109 These goals, of course, are central to many
recent progressive-property accounts.110 In contrast to Section 8, projectbased programs, by their very definition, do not empower low-income
households to participate in the rental housing market, and they do not
therefore advance the dignity or autonomy of their recipients as fully as
does Section 8.
Furthermore, the assistance given to low-income households through
the Section 8 program is narrowly targeted: rather than a pure cash
transfer to low-income households, which might be used to purchase a
variety of goods, Section 8 assistance can be used only to participate in
the housing market. By insisting upon the importance of one specific end
among the many material needs facing low-income households—namely,
the need for some minimum degree of adequate housing—Section 8 seeks
to advance the new progressive property’s commitment to one of the
essential and incommensurable components of human flourishing.111
Finally, Section 8 seeks to promote economically mixed housing,112 and

voucher program’s efficacy in promoting the dignity and autonomy of voucher recipients. See, e.g.,
Statement of Terri Ceaser, Testimony before House Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity,
Comm. on Fin. Servs., June 10, 2003, at 28 (“When . . . I was issued a housing voucher, I was able
to move my children to a decent and affordable home in a safe neighborhood. . . . Not only are my
children busy with their studies, but I . . . will complete graduate school in December 2004. . . . The
voucher has assured my family of the stability needed for my children to succeed in school . . . .
Section 8 has afforded me the opportunity to provide my family with a stable and safe environment,
so I consider this a hand up, not a hand out.”); Statement of Telissa Dowling, Testimony before
House Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity, Comm. on Fin. Servs., June 10, 2003, at 29–
30 (“Without a voucher I would not have been able to get my degree. I might not have a job, and
my daughter and I would still be homeless.”); Statement of Leona Thompson, Testimony before
House Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty Opportunity, Comm. on Fin. Servs., July 1, 2003, at 135 (“I
owe a great deal of thanks and appreciation to the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles
Section 8 program . . . for providing the resources and information . . . and self-empowerment to
rise above the elements that keep so many people in economic bondage. . . . I received a certificate
in medical assisting, a certificate in nurse assisting. . . . [and] I’ve secured enrollment for my sons to
attend college preparatory schools.”).
109. See, e.g., DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 78, at 1-3 (noting that the early rise
of the Section 8 voucher program, and its relative popularity with both low-income families, local
governments, and federal legislators was due in part to its ability to provide assistance quickly, to
provide low-income families with a measure of choice, and to provide low-income families with a
measure of anonymity).
110. See supra note 46 and accompanying text; see also Peñalver, supra note 7, at 882–83
(discussing the need to protect certain crucially important dignitary interests in property law).
111. I am grateful to Eduardo Peñalver for this point. See E-mail from Eduardo Peñalver to
Zachary Bray (Dec. 7, 2011) (on file with author).
112. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (2006); see also DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note
78, at 1-3 (noting that the early rise of the Section 8 voucher program, and its relative popularity
with low-income families, local governments, and federal legislators was due in part to its ability to
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it achieves greater integration,113 a goal clearly in line with the
communitarian focus of recent progressive-property accounts.114
In sum, Section 8 is a good example of the new progressive property,
even though it has not previously been so identified. Section 8 fits well
with many of the values described and prescribed in recent progressiveproperty accounts; indeed, it serves these ends at least as effectively as
every other federal low-income housing program.115 It also serves these
allow low-income families to disperse throughout the larger community).
However, the integration of Section 8–assisted households into more affluent neighborhoods is not
always harmonious, especially when it occurs relatively rapidly, as some recent stories have
indicated. See, e.g., Jennifer Medina, Seeking a Better Life, Section 8 Renters Encounter Resistance,
N.Y. TIMES, August 11, 2011, at A13 (detailing resistance of existing residents of Lancaster,
California, a town in Los Angeles County, to the recently increased presence of Section 8–assisted
tenants). Some might argue that the potential for rapid neighborhood change that can be seen from
such stories potentially undermines the communitarian goals central to recent progressive-property
accounts; others might see these sorts of stories as little more than typical NIMBY behavior by
existing residents, which does not override the benefits to the larger community gained from
increased residential economic integration.
Regardless, it is important to realize that stories about floods of voucher-assisted households are
outliers: whether they live in the suburbs or in central cities, the overwhelming majority of voucher
holders live in neighborhoods with very few other voucher recipients. SCHWARTZ, supra note 83, at
204–05 (noting that although vouchers promote economic residential integration, voucher residents
tend to disperse from one another; neighborhoods with more than 10% of households receiving
vouchers comprise only 4.3% of central city neighborhoods, and only 1% of suburban
neighborhoods). In other words, Section 8 promotes economically mixed housing better than
alternative federal housing programs and with relatively few side effects.
Moreover, there is reason to believe that Section 8 tends to promote greater integration of
minorities than alternative federal housing programs. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, supra note 83, at 190–
95, 205–06 (collecting data and concluding that while minority Section 8 voucher holders do tend
to reside in minority neighborhoods, when compared to the beneficiaries of alternative federal
housing programs, minority Section 8 voucher recipients are less likely to live in highly segregated
neighborhoods). Although this is not an express statutory goal of the Section 8 program, it is clearly
a side effect in accord with the communitarian focus of recent progressive-property accounts.
113. See, e.g., Byrne & Diamond, supra note 82, at 555–56 (noting that despite its limited
funding and reluctance by some landlords to participate in the program, “there seems little doubt
that Section 8 has given many recipients a greater opportunity for integration into a more diverse
society than public housing would have afforded them”); see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 83, at 188
(gathering sources and noting that “voucher recipients tend to live in communities that are far more
typical of all renters than do public housing residents”); Ellickson, supra note 89, at 1010–16
(expressing skepticism about the magnitude of the benefits of neighborhood economic integration,
but concluding that the Section 8 voucher program “is the more potent instrument [compared to
project-based programs] for the affirmative promotion of economic integration”);.
114. See supra notes 31–37 and accompanying text.
115. Of course, after comparing Section 8 and alternative federal low-income housing
programs to the central common characteristics of recent progressive-property accounts, one might
well conclude that Section 8 is a better example of the new progressive-property approach than
these alternatives. My conclusion here is slightly weaker: I claim only that Section 8 is at least as
good an example of the new progressive property as alternative federal low-income housing
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progressive-property ends much more efficiently than other federal lowincome housing programs.116 Accordingly, comparing Section 8 to other
low-income housing programs suggests a more general point about the
previously ambiguous nature of overall economic efficiency within a
progressive-property framework: when comparing a program or property
regime to alternative programs, if the initial program serves the central
ends of the new progressive property at least as well as its alternatives
but with greater efficiency, then from a progressive-property perspective,
such a program should be more worthy of protection or advancement
than the related or alternative programs—especially if the two programs
conflict.117 This general rule incorporates considerations of economic
efficiency into a progressive-property framework while keeping them
subordinate to the central values and ends of recent progressive-property
accounts. Using this general rule, along with the plural norms central to
recent progressive-property accounts, contemporary rent control can be
evaluated in its own right and compared with Section 8 from a
progressive-property perspective.
B. Rent Control as an Example of the New Progressive Property
Although Section 8 has never previously been identified as an
example of the new progressive property, some recent progressiveproperty accounts have already picked out local rent-control and evictionprotection ordinances as examples of the norms and values for which
programs, and is more efficient (or, at least, less inefficient) to boot.
116. See GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra note 78, at 115 (“We are sympathetic to the view that
cash is preferable to in-kind transfers, but if we are going to subsidize the housing of the poor, then
vouchers are preferable to all the existing alternatives.”); SCHWARTZ, supra note 83, at 206–07
(noting that rental vouchers are far less expensive per unit [than project-based alternatives],
“potentially allowing the government to assist more households with the same amount of funding”);
Ellickson, supra note 89, at 995 (noting that “most housing economists who have addressed the
issue assert that, as a general matter, portable tenant-based subsidies are markedly more efficient
and fairer than project-based subsidies”).
117. The straightforward logic behind this conclusion is especially clear with respect to
otherwise progressive housing programs. As discussed above, programs that serve the generally
progressive goal of providing decent low-income housing are not entitlements in the United States.
See supra note 85 and accompanying text. Accordingly, using overall efficiency as a tie-breaker
between otherwise comparably progressive housing programs allows policy makers to provide more
low-income housing.
As will be discussed in greater detail below, two or more otherwise progressive-property programs
may conflict with one another, creating unintended consequences that are antithetical to the to the
central values and ends of the new progressive-property approach. See infra Part IV. Therefore, the
general rule of thumb discussed here may have significant impacts on arguments about specific
property programs with substantial practical impact.
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they advocate. More specifically, some recent progressive-property
accounts have pointed out that local rent-control and eviction-protection
ordinances attempt to protect crucially important dignitary interests
through property law—namely, the longstanding bonds that some land
users form with land they do not own.118 In addition, some accounts
have identified the standard defense of rent control, discussed in more
detail below, as an important precursor to many of the arguments central
to the new progressive property.119
Although some recent progressive-property accounts have already
noted the link between the new progressive property and the standard
defense for rent control, some brief background about the long and
somewhat complicated evolution of rent-control is necessary before
analyzing whether contemporary, local rent-control and evictionprotection ordinances are a good fit with the ends and values advanced
by the new progressive property. Though rent control programs are in
relative decline today,120 rent control has, in the past, been among the
most significant governmental programs designed to provide affordable
housing in the United States.121
The history of rent control programs is arguably older than the
common law,122 but the history of rent control in this country did not
begin until the World War I era, when several cities and states adopted
temporary rent-control or eviction-control measures.123 Although rent

118. See, e.g., Peñalver, supra note 7, at 882–83 (suggesting that some property regimes and
doctrines do recognize the “crucially important dignitary interests” key to a virtue-based normative
theory of property, and citing rent control and eviction-protection statutes as an example of same).
119. See Alexander, Pluralism and Property, supra note 6, at 1017–19, 1032–35 (discussing
Margaret Radin’s personhood theory of property generally and her arguments regarding the
normative justifiability of rent control specifically, and concluding that both share important
characteristics with his social obligation theory of property).
120. GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra note 78, at 59 (noting that “[t]here are now only four states
in the United States with rent-controlled cities: California, Maryland, New York, and New Jersey”).
121. See, e.g., id. at 58 (“Rent control historically has been among the most important
interventions in housing markets.”).
122. See, e.g., John W. Willis, A Short History of Rent Control Laws, 36 CORNELL L.Q . 54,
59–68 (1950) (detailing history of rent control efforts from Roman law through the 20th Century).
123. See, e.g., Kenneth K. Baar, Rent Control in the 1970’s: The Case of the New Jersey
Tenants’ Movement, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1976) (“Between the years 1920 and 1923,
several cities and states adopted rent control or eviction control statutes in response to the housing
crisis created by World War I. They were seen as temporary emergency measures which would have
been unconstitutional under normal peacetime conditions.”).
The temporary nature of these original American rent and eviction control restrictions was
underscored by the Supreme Court, which held that such “regulation[s] [may be] justified only as a
temporary measure. A limit in time, to tide over a passing trouble, well may justify a law that could
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and eviction controls are creatures of state and local law today,124 the
history of rent control in this country has been marked by two significant
federal interventions. The first occurred with the reintroduction of rent
controls by the federal government during World War II, as part of the
federal government’s general price-control program.125 Federal rent
control was short-lived, essentially ending after wartime price controls
expired, and the end of wartime federal controls left to state and local
governments the issue of whether to keep, modify, or abolish rent
control.126 However, federal rent controls emerged again in the early
1970s, when President Nixon ordered an initial ninety-day national
freeze and subsequent limited caps on rents, wages, and prices,127 using
the power granted to the executive under the Economic Stabilization Act
of 1970.128 Although this second round of federal rent controls was
short-lived,129 a second wave of state and local rent controls emerged in

not be upheld as a permanent change.” Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 157 (1921). By 1929, even
New York City, the American jurisdiction with perhaps the longest and most extensive experience
with rent control, had abolished its initial World War I-era rent controls. Baar, supra, at 634.
124. See GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra note 78, at 59 (noting that rent control has been
effectively turned over to state and local governments); Kathryn Lori Partrick, Comment, Rent
Control: A Practical Guide for Tenant Organizations, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1185, 1187 (1978)
(noting the various ways that state and local governments can enact rent control legislation).
125. GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra note 78, at 58–59.
126. See, e.g., id. (noting that once the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 expired after
World War II, federal rent control on new buildings was eliminated by the Federal Housing and
Rent Act of 1947, which effectively ended federal involvement in rent control, making rent control
or its absence a state and local issue).
127. See Exec. Order No. 11,615, 3 C.F.R. 602 (1971–75) (known as “Phase I,” beginning
on August 15, 1971, and involving an initial ninety-day freeze on all wages, prices, and rents); Exec.
Order No. 11,627, 3 C.F.R. 621 (1971–75) (known as “Phase II,” beginning on December 28,
1971 and ending January 12, 1973, and involving a subsequent economic stabilization program,
which permitted landlords to increase rents by a limited amount each year”).
The limited amount of rent increases landlords were allowed to seek under Phase II was
complicated and varied across states, municipalities, and even individual units, depending in part on
the basis of state and local property tax increases, potential increases based on capital
improvements, lease renewals, and hardship operations, as well as exemptions for small-scale
landlords. Partrick, supra note 124, at 1186. Accordingly, many units were not subject to Phase II’s
regulation, and the overall enforcement of the regulations under Phase II, even for units nominally
subject to the regulations, was relatively lax. Baar, supra note 123, at 639–40.
128. Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, tit. II, 84 Stat. 799 (1970)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (2006)).
129. Phase II was followed by Phase III, initiated by Exec. Order No. 11,695, 3 C.F.R. 741
(1971–75), which called for voluntary restraint regarding rent increases, but state and local rent
control measures began to be passed at the end of Phase II. See, e.g., Partrick, supra note 124, at
1186 (noting that “[t]he termination of Phase II controls prompted passage of significant state and
local rent control measures”).
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the mid- to late-1970s.130
Over the course of their history in the United States, rent and
eviction controls have taken two forms.131 The first type, sometimes
called “first generation rent controls,”132 involves straightforward caps
on rents at a level below market rates.133 The second type, sometimes
called “second generation rent controls,”134 allows rent levels to be set
more or less freely when tenants first occupy an apartment, but then limit
subsequent increases as long as the tenant remains.135 Second
generation rent controls may also contain eviction controls, which limit
the permissible grounds for eviction and set procedures for local
enforcement to prevent landlords from circumventing the substantive
rent-increase restrictions by threatening to evict tenants who refuse to
pay rent increases.136 For example, the Los Angeles Rent Stabilization
Ordinance (“LARSO”),137 which is discussed at greater length below, is
such a second-generation local rent-control ordinance.138 Today, both

130. See, e.g., Baar, supra note 123, at 640–41 (noting that “[t]he termination of Phase II
controls on January 12, 1973, resulted in the passage of more state and local rent controls,” and
collecting examples from Maryland, New Jersey, Maine, Washington D.C., and Alaska).
131. See, e.g., GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra note 78, at 59 (“There have been two basic types
of rent control in the United States. One . . . has capped rents at a level far below current market
rates for those tenants who have lived in their apartments for a long time. Those rent levels would
not persist if these tenants moved. The other type, often referred to as rent stabilization . . . allows
landlords and tenants to fix rents more or less freely when the tenants first occupy the apartment,
but limits increases thereafter.”).
132. See, e.g., David Shulman, Real Estate Valuation Under Rent control: The Case of Santa
Monica, 9 J. AM. REAL EST. & URB. ECON. ASS’N 38, 39–40 (1981) (discussing background of first
and second generation rent controls); see also Richard E. Blumberg, Brian Quinn Robbins &
Kenneth K. Baar, The Emergence of Second Generation Rent Controls, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 240
(1974).
133. GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra note 78, at 59.
134. See, e.g., Shulman, supra note 132, at 39–40 (1981) (discussing background of first and
second generation rent controls); see also Blumberg, Robbins, & Baar, The Emergence of Second
Generation Rent controls, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 240 (1974).
135. GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra note 78, at 59.
136. Partrick, supra note 124, at 1202–03 (claiming that because landlords hold dominant
bargaining positions when housing is in short supply, and because rent-control restrictions alone
may be “circumvented by landlords who threaten to evict tenants who refuse to pay rent increases,”
some rent-control measures “often limit the permissible grounds for eviction and set procedures for
local enforcement”).
137. L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 15 (1979), available at http://bit.ly/ReEuEn.
138. LARSO contains both restrictions on rent, see, for example, chapter 15, section
151.04(A) of the Los Angeles Municipal Code (prohibiting any landlord from “demand[ing],
accept[ing], or retain[ing] more than the maximum adjusted rent permitted pursuant to this
chapter”), and limitations on the permissible grounds for eviction, see, for example, chapter 15,
section 151.09 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code of 1979 (setting forth permissible grounds for
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forms of rent control are dying out: only a few states contain
municipalities with either type, and many states ban rent control
outright.139
Critics of rent control argue that its popularity is dramatically
dwindling both because it has failed in its main goal of making housing
more affordable in high-cost markets, and because its many side effects
have become more widely acknowledged since the last wave of rentcontrol ordinances were enacted in the 1970s.140 The standard
arguments against rent control are numerous and well developed: critics
argue that rent control is highly inefficient and distorts housing
markets;141 is a poorly focused and potentially unfair redistribution
device;142 exacerbates the very housing shortages it is designed to

eviction limited, for most rental units, to non-payment of rent, violation of the tenancy agreement,
nuisance or criminal activity, refusal to grant access, renew a lease, unapproved subtenancies,
renovations, demolition, removal from the rental market, or use of the property by the landlord or a
family member or a resident manager, or government order).
LARSO is best understood as a second-generation rent-control ordinance: when the rental unit is
voluntarily vacated by a tenant, or vacated as a result of a certain permissible evictions, then “[t]he
landlord may increase the maximum rent. . . to any amount upon re-rental” of the unit. L.A., CAL.,
MUN. CODE ch. 15, § 151.06(C) (1979).
139. See, e.g., GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra note 78, at 59 (noting that “[t]oday, thirty-two
states ban their municipalities from enacting local rent control rules,” and “only four states in the
United States [contain] rent-controlled cities: California, Maryland, New York, and New Jersey”).
140. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54
BROOK. L. REV. 741, 770 (1988) (claiming that “the economics profession is united over rent
control, as it is not over any other issue”); Edgar O. Olsen, Is Rent Control Good Social Policy?, 67
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 931, 940–41 (1991) (claiming that “[t]he shortcomings of rent-control
ordinances are not limited to their unjustifiable patterns of benefits and costs,” but also because
they are “highly inefficient redistributive devices” that “lead to higher costs of producing housing
services in both the controlled and uncontrolled sectors,” as well as to “haphazard changes in
consumption patterns by occupants of controlled units”); see also Bruno S. Frey et al., Consensus
and Dissension Among Economists: An Empirical Inquiry, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 986, 988, 991 (1984)
(noting that only 1.9 percent of the economists surveyed disagreed with the proposition that a
“ceiling on rents reduces the quantity and quality of housing available”).
141. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 140, at 770 (claiming that “[t]he strength of the [efficiency]
case [against rent control] is shown by the efforts to circumvent it” because “[t]here is simply no
effort to show that misallocations associated with rent control do not exist”);Olsen, supra note 140,
at 944–45 (arguing that “[t]he benefits of a mature rent-control ordinance to tenants is far less than
its cost to landlords because it leads to distortions in the consumption patterns of tenants and the
production decisions of landlords” as well as “haphazard changes in consumption patterns”).
142. See, e.g., Olsen, supra note 140, at 944 (“No compelling justification has been offered for
financing benefits to tenants by an implicit tax on landlords. There is no satisfactory explanation of
why the magnitude of this tax on equally wealthy people should depend on the proportion of their
assets held in . . . rental housing. The pattern of benefits is equally indefensible. . . . In short, rent
control is a poorly focused redistributive device.”).
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reduce;143 reduces tenant mobility and increases commuting costs;144
leads to unnecessarily formalized relationships between landlords and
tenants, crowding out the possibility for increased social capital;145
distorts landlords’ incentives to maintain building quality, leading to
dilapidation;146 and tends to reduce the possibility of cooperation and
increase the possibility of nasty behavior between landlords and
tenants.147 Much, though not all, of this criticism obviously comes from
economists or scholars writing in what progressive-property accounts
refer to as the law-and-economics approach.
The leading contemporary argument in defense of rent control has
many similarities to the new progressive property;148 indeed, some
recent progressive-property accounts have acknowledged the close links
between the new progressive property and the ideas behind rent
control’s standard defense.149 The standard defense of rent control
admits the potential efficiency losses picked out by many critics of rent
control, but suggests that these potential losses may be offset by other
gains of rent control, at least in certain situations.150 More specifically,
143. Epstein, supra note 140, at 767 (arguing that “[a]ll rent control statutes . . . depress the
future total return of any investment,” leading to reduced future investments in housing stock, “so
that rent control statutes only exacerbate the housing shortages they are said to alleviate”).
144. Robert C. Ellickson, Rent Control: A Comment on Olsen, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 947, 948,
952–53 (1991) (noting that “[a]ll scholars agree that rent control lessens tenant mobility,” which
“may lock in stale households,” “lock out the fresh entrants the community most needs to retain its
vitality,” and “increase commuting costs” for both tenants in rent controlled units and others).
145. Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the
Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226, 326 (2006) (noting that rent control “spawn[s] some of the most
legalized of midgame relationships between landlords and tenants” who are then “uncommonly
likely to turn to lawyers and courts to resolve spats”).
146. See, e.g., GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra note 78, at 60 (noting that rent control “limits
landlords’ incentive to invest in building quality,” then gathering citations and noting the “abundant
evidence” on the link between “rent control and quality deterioration”).
147. See, e.g., Ellickson, Rent control, supra note 144, at 949 (noting that “[r]ent control . . .
tends to lock landlords and tenants into continuing uncooperative relationships” and “breeds
nastiness in landlord-tenant interactions”).
148. Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350 (1986). The
pre-eminence of Radin’s defense of rent control can be seen in the prominence of her arguments in
many of the leading critiques of rent control. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 140, at 770–73 (focusing
solely on Radin’s “communitarian” defense of rent control); see also Olsen, supra note 140, at 934–
35 (noting that Radin’s detailed analysis stands in “stark contrast with the many superficial attempts
to justify rent control”).
149. See supra notes 118–119 and accompanying text.
150. Radin, supra note 148, at 352 (suggesting that “the level of efficiency losses” picked out
by critics of rent control might “be outweighed by other gains” and offering instead a normative
account of the potential value of rent control “that takes into account the uncertainties and
complexities of actual practice”).
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the standard defense of rent control begins by suggesting, as a baseline,
that most tenants generally ought to have a stronger interest in retaining
their longstanding homes than most landlords ought to have with respect
to their freedom of contract or the maintenance of their profit
margins.151 However, according to the standard defense of rent control,
this baseline rule does not apply to would-be tenants, because their
potential property interest in a future tenancy has not yet become bound
up, in meaningful, noncommercial ways, with their personhood.152 Thus,
the standard defense suggests that rent and eviction controls may be
justified, even in the face of some of the negative side effects identified by
various critics, as long as those controls can be justified in terms of more
significant benefits related to protecting property interests in personhood
or existing communities.153
This reasoning has obvious similarities to recent progressiveproperty accounts.154 However, at least one recent progressive-property
account has argued that progressive-property theory can and should be
able to provide a more complete evaluation of rent-and-eviction controls
because the standard personhood defense of rent control, despite its
express consideration of certain communitarian goals, fails to give
aggregate well-being its due.155 More specifically, according to recent
progressive-property accounts, although the standard defense identifies
important values potentially served by rent and eviction controls, it fails
to provide the sort of systematic framework for evaluating how much
loss, and what sorts of negative side effects, should be tolerated to serve
these values.156 By its own terms, then, the new progressive property
151. See id. at 359–60 (stating “[t]he intuitive general rule . . . that preservation of one’s
home . . . [or] noncommercial personal use of an apartment as a home is morally entitled to more
weight than purely commercial landlording”).
152. Id. at 361–62.
153. Id. at 371. Radin does not attempt to provide a blanket defense of rent control; arguing
that in situations where “it does not make sense to speak of property for personhood or of
community with respect to the tenants involved, then on balance rent control may not be justified,
especially if most landlords appear noncommercial or efficiency losses are high.” Id.
154. See, e.g., JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND
THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 20 (2010) (drawing a relationship between Radin’s theory of property as
personhood and the communitarian, virtue-ethics based theory advanced by Peñalver).
155. Peñalver, supra note 7, at 862.
156. Id. More specifically, according to Peñalver, although Radin makes “a convincing case”
for granting tenants some form of rent and eviction control based on the potential value of some
tenants’ attachments to their long-time homes – a potential value much in keeping with the recent
progressive-property accounts – her account is ultimately flawed because it “provides no framework
for assessing how much of an economic sacrifice society ought to tolerate . . . to protect the
personhood interests of individual tenants.” Id.
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must be capable of providing a more thorough, systematic, and contextspecific evaluation of both the benefits and the costs of rent and eviction
controls if it is to provide a new and lasting contribution to this debate.
What, then, should an evaluation of rent and eviction controls based
on recent progressive-property accounts look like? The substantive
similarities between the standard defense of rent control and the new
progressive property have already been noted.157 To improve upon the
standard defense of rent control, therefore, an evaluation of rent control
from the perspective of the new progressive property must begin where
the standard defense of rent control leaves off: by providing greater
specificity about when, on balance, rent control may not be justified,
given its acknowledged negative side effects.158 Because of the
importance of context to recent progressive-property accounts,159 such
an evaluation is not possible in the abstract: some general comparison to
another property program or, if possible, some specific situation
involving rent control must be analyzed. At the end of this Part, I provide
such a comparison, analyzing rent control and the federal Section 8
housing voucher program from a progressive property standpoint. In
Part IV.B below, rent control’s relative merit or lack thereof from a
progressive-property perspective will be examined in the context of the
rent and eviction control ordinances in Los Angeles, their interaction
with Section 8, and the conflict at the center of this interaction. But
before turning to the close examination of rent control and Section 8 in
such a specific situation, it is useful to compare rent control and Section
8 more generally.
As discussed above, many of rent control’s acknowledged negative
side effects arise from its inefficient distortion of economic incentives for
participants in housing markets.160 However, some of rent control’s
negative side effects also impact ends that are more central to recent
progressive-property accounts.161 In light of these substantial negative
and anti-progressive side effects of rent control,162 Section 8, which
157. See supra notes 148–155 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 153.
159. See Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, supra note 4, at 744 (claiming
that deliberation about property entitlements “should include non-deductive, non-algorithmic
reflection” that is “both principled and contextual”).
160. See supra notes 140–144 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 142, 144–147 and accompanying text (noting that rent control may
seem unfair, may breed “nastiness” in landlord and tenant behavior, and may lock the parties into
prolonged and uncooperative social relationships).
162. To be clear, in calling these side effects “negative” or “undesirable,” I mean only that
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largely lacks such negative and anti-progressive side effects, seems on
balance to be at least as progressive as rent control.163 At the same time,
of course, Section 8 does not impose the sorts of inefficient distortions
that rent control inflicts on housing markets.164 In other words, although
rent control has previously been identified as an example of the new
progressive property,165 and although Section 8 has not previously been
so identified, Section 8 is at least as progressive as rent control. It is also
more efficient.
This conclusion has a number of important consequences for both
low-income housing policy and the larger academic debate. To begin, as
argued above,166 if a program such as Section 8 serves the central ends
of the new progressive property at least as well as its alternatives but
with greater efficiency, then from a progressive-property perspective, one
should generally seek to protect or advance such a program at the
expense of the less efficient alternative, especially if the programs
conflict. Accordingly, if, as I argue in Part IV below, the intersection of
rent control and Section 8 generates conflict that is deeply antithetical to
the ends advanced by recent progressive-property accounts, then it will
be necessary to consider policy solutions that seek to preserve Section 8
while eliminating or phasing out rent control, even from the standpoint
of the new progressive property.167
they are antithetical to the central values and ends described in recent progressive-property
accounts, aside from whatever negative effects they may have according to other approaches to
property law and theory. Insofar as they are antithetical to the central values and ends described in
recent progressive-property accounts, they are also “anti-progressive,” and I use the term in this
sense.
163. Of course, after comparing Section 8’s beneficial impact on the dignity and autonomy of
many low-income tenants with the related anti-progressive social and behavioral side effects of rent
control, one might well conclude that Section 8 is a better practical example of the values and ends
endorsed by the new progressive property than rent control. My conclusion here is slightly weaker:
at this point, I claim only that Section 8 is at least as good an example of the values and ends
endorsed by the new progressive-property approach as most local rent-control ordinances, and more
efficient (or, at least, less inefficient) to boot. For an argument on progressive-property grounds that
that rent control should be eliminated or phased out in most contexts in favor of Section 8, see Part
IV.B and Part V, infra at notes 216–231 and accompanying text.
164. Compare, e.g., note 116 and accompanying text (gathering sources and concluding that
Section 8 is a more efficient means of low-income housing assistance, or at least less inefficient, than
existing alternatives), with, for example, notes 140–144 and accompanying text (describing rent
control’s inefficient distortion of housing markets).
165. See supra notes 118–119 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
167. See infra Part IV.B. This means that, contrary to conventional wisdom, there is a
significant practical convergence in this context between the ultimate policy solutions that should be
prescribed by both the new progressive-property approach and by the law-and-economics approach.
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IV. LESSONS FOR THE NEW PROGRESSIVE-PROPERTY APPROACH FROM
THE INTERSECTION OF RENT CONTROL AND SECTION 8
Part IV moves beyond the general comparison of rent control and
the federal Section 8 housing voucher program to look more closely at
their intersection through the lens of recent litigation. Part IV.A reviews
this litigation in detail. Part IV.B discusses the significance of this
litigation and the broader conflict between Section 8 and rent control
that this litigation illuminates for the new progressive-property approach.
Part IV.B concludes by suggesting that even from a progressive-property
perspective, it may be appropriate to phase out or eliminate rent control
to protect the progressive property ends that Section 8 realizes.
A. Recent Litigation at the Intersection of Rent Control and Section 8
Recent litigation arising from the intersection of the federal Section 8
housing voucher program and local rent and eviction controls offers a
unique opportunity to test and clarify the new progressive property. In
particular, this conflict makes it possible to further clarify the ambiguous
role of some basic law-and-economics tools within the larger progressiveproperty framework, by demonstrating additional significant and
practical roles for these tools that advance, rather than compromise, the
fundamental norms and goals of progressive property theory. Moreover,
examining the conflict between Section 8 and local rent and eviction
controls sheds new and useful light on the new progressive property’s
communitarian nature. To explore these insights, it will first be necessary
to look at the litigation that reveals the low-income housing conflict at the
intersection of Section 8 and rent control in more detail.
This conflict has been most visible in Southern California—more
specifically in greater Los Angeles—which possesses a rental-housing
market that is unusually significant and complicated.168 Due to Los

In short, both positions should lead to the conclusion that rent control should be eliminated or
phased out, for the reasons discussed above from a law-and-economics perspective, see notes 140–
144 and accompanying text, and for the reasons given below from a progressive-property
perspective, see infra Part IV.B.
168. The share of Los Angeles residents who rent their homes is double the national rate,
though roughly equivalent to the rental rate of other major U.S. metropolitan areas, such as New
York and Chicago. DANIEL FLAMING ET AL., ECONOMIC ROUNDTABLE, ECONOMIC STUDY OF THE
RENT STABILIZATION ORDINANCE AND THE LOS ANGELES HOUSING MARKET 26, 29 (2009).
However, Los Angeles renters typically pay a larger share of their income than renters in either New
York or Chicago, and substantially more than average renters elsewhere in the United States. Id. at
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Angeles’s size and socioeconomic diversity, the Section 8 housing
voucher program, administered through Los Angeles-area PHAs, is one
of the largest in the nation.169 Yet Section 8 is not the only housingassistance regime in Los Angeles. Rent control also plays an important
role, as Los Angeles is also home to one of the most significant,
remaining, local rent-control ordinances in the United States. The Los
Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance (“LARSO”), enacted in 1979,170 is
an example of a second-generation rent-control ordinance: it contains
provisions for limited annual rent increases171 as well as a series of
eviction restrictions that limit the legal grounds on which landlords may
evict tenants.172 Within the City of Los Angeles, LARSO covers all rental
units in buildings with two or more rental units constructed before
October 1, 1978, with a few additional exceptions and exemptions.173 As
a result, the number of rental units subject to LARSO has tended to
decline since 1978, as new units have been constructed and old units
have passed through LARSO’s various exceptions and exemptions;174
however, LARSO still covers over 620,000 rental units,175 a total
equivalent to almost two-thirds of all rental units and about forty percent
of all housing in Los Angeles.176 Permissible grounds for eviction under
28. From 1970 until 2006, Los Angeles’s population grew 34 % while its housing inventory grew
only 26%. Id. at 25–26. Much of this scarcity can be attributed to the 1980s, when Los Angeles’s
population grew 17% but the housing inventory grew only 9%. Id. Los Angeles’s rent-control
ordinance, discussed in more detail immediately below, was enacted in 1979.
169. The Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (“HACLA”), a Los Angeles-area PHA
that administers the Section 8 housing voucher program in the area, administers the second-largest
housing voucher program in the United States, with a total of over 45,000 housing vouchers at
present. See Section 8 Housing, HACLA, http://www.hacla.org/section8/ (last updated Oct. 2012).
170. L.A. , CAL, MUN. CODE ch. 15 (2012), available at http://bit.ly/ReEuEn.
171. See id. §§ 151.04(A), 151.06(C) (detailing restrictions on annual rent increases for
existing tenancies and the permissible grounds for maximum rent increases including annual
adjustments and unrestricted increases during permissible vacancies or evictions).
172. See id. § 151.09 (detailing permissible grounds for eviction in registered rent-controlled
units in Los Angeles).
173. Id. § 151.02 (Rental Units) (defining those rental units covered by LARSO). Additional
exceptions include units taken out of the rental housing market as well as those that have undergone
“substantial renovation” since 1980, as determined by reference to the cost of the renovation. Id.
174. For more detailed information about the distribution of lost rent-controlled units in Los
Angeles, and the relation of this loss to the construction of new affordable-housing rental units, see
BETH STECKLER & ADAM GARCIA, AFFORDABILITY MATTERS: A LOOK AT HOUSING CONSTRUCTION
& AFFORDABILITY IN LOS ANGELES 25–29 (2008), available at http://www.livableplaces.org/files/
Affordability+Matters+Final+2.pdf.
175. L.A. HOUS. DEP’T, POLICY & PLANNING UNIT, A GUIDE TO AFFORDABLE RENTAL
HOUSING IN THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES 4 (2011).
176. DANIEL FLAMING ET AL., supra note 168, at 2.
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LARSO for registered units are limited to nonpayment of rent and a few
other narrow grounds, including removal from the rental market,
significant tenant misconduct, or criminal activity.177 LARSO’s rent
controls and eviction restrictions apply to tenants who are assisted by the
Section 8 housing voucher program, provided that they live in a rental
unit that qualifies for LARSO’s protections.178 At the same time, of
course, tenants can be covered by LARSO’s restrictions on rent
increases and permissible grounds for eviction even if they do not qualify
for the Section 8 housing voucher program, again, provided that they live
in a rental unit that qualifies for LARSO’s protections.179 As a result,
tens of thousands of low-income tenants in Los Angeles who participate
in the Section 8 housing voucher program have used their vouchers in
rent-controlled units, often living alongside unassisted tenants, many of
whom enjoy the same restrictions on rent increases and permissible
grounds for eviction imposed by LARSO as their Section 8–assisted
neighbors.
During the last decade, California landlords in rent-controlled
jurisdictions—particularly in greater Los Angeles—began using various
new types of form eviction notices, marketed by law firms, in a series of
attempts to evict substantial numbers of tenants who were both receiving
Section 8 housing-voucher assistance and living in rent-controlled
units.180 The forms changed over time in response to legal challenges by
177. See § 151.09 (setting forth permissible grounds for eviction— limited, for most rental
units, to non-payment of rent, violation of the tenancy agreement, nuisance or criminal activity,
refusal to grant access, renew a lease, unapproved subtenancies, renovations, demolition, removal
from the rental market, use of the property by the landlord or a family member or a resident
manager, or government order).
178. See id. § 151.02 (Rental Units) (5) (expressly noting that LARSO’s protections and
restrictions also apply to “rental units for which rental assistance is paid pursuant to the [Section 8]
Housing Choice Voucher Program codified at 24 C.F.R. part 982,”); see also Barrientos v. 1801–
1825 Morton LLC, 583 F.3d 1197, 1205–06 (9th Cir. 2009) (commenting on same).
179. Indeed, the many exceptions to LARSO’s coverage suggest that objections about the lack
of fairness and distributional equity often levied against rent control in general may be particularly
significant in this context. The fact that some relatively affluent tenants qualify for LARSO’s
protection while some relatively poorer tenants do not is one of the main objections raised by critics
of this rent-control program. See, e.g., Paul Habibi & Eric Sussman, Op-Ed., L.A. Should Abandon
Rent Control, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 2010 (claiming that it “makes little sense” that under LARSO, a
“lawyer earning $200,000 a year renting in a pre-1978 building would be afforded the benefits of
rent control, whereas a struggling retiree living off Social Security, but renting in a post-1978
building, would not”). In general, a perceived lack of distributional equity is both an anti-progressive
feature and a common criticism of rent control. See supra notes 47 and 142 and accompanying text.
180. For one example of these efforts and the litigation that ensued, see Barrientos, 583 F.3d
at 1197. Barrientos and the immediately related litigation in California state and federal courts
provide the most prominent example of litigation arising out of this fundamental conflict, but not
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some tenants, but the essential substance remained the same, as all of the
form notices were ostensibly based on federal regulations enacted to
implement the Section 8 housing voucher program. The federal
regulations cited in the form notices provide a general baseline of
standards that apply to landlords and tenants who wish to participate in
the federal program.181 Among them is the “good cause” eviction
standard, which provides additional substance to the statutory mandate
that “during the term of the [assisted tenant’s] lease, the owner shall not
terminate the tenancy except for serious or repeated violation of the
terms and conditions of the lease, for violation of applicable Federal,
State, or local law, or for other good cause.”182
More specifically, the federal good-cause eviction standard, as fully
defined in the relevant regulations, provides that “‘other good cause’ . . .
may include, but is not limited to . . . [a] business or economic reason for
termination of the tenancy (such as sale of the property, renovation of
the unit, or desire to lease the unit at a higher rental).”183 Without citing
any unit-specific facts that might be related to a business opportunity as
defined by the statute and regulation, and without any other support
related to specific tenant misconduct or another appropriate good-cause
eviction ground under federal law or LARSO, the form notices simply
cited the federal good-cause statute and regulations and stated that the
landlord intended to terminate the assisted tenancy for a general

the only example, as similar litigation has arisen in other cities with both substantial rent control and
large populations of Section 8–assisted tenants.
More specifically, similar issues arose in litigation in New York, in, for example, Rosario v. Diagonal
Realty, L.L.C., 872 N.E.2d 860 (N.Y. 2007), in which the right of tenants assisted by the Section 8
housing voucher program to request renewal of their leases under local rent stabilization ordinances
was also challenged and affirmed. For a more fulsome discussion of Rosario, and its close
relationship to Barrientos and other similar state cases in California, see, for example, Erin Liotta,
United States Agrees that HUD Voucher Regulations Do Not Preempt Local Eviction Controls, 39
HOUSING L. BULL. 201, 202 n.15 (2009) (noting the similarities between Barrientos and Rosario),
and Jason Lee, New York’s Highest Court Rules NYC Voucher Owners Must Offer Assisted Renewal
Leases, 37 HOUSING L. BULL.158 (2007) (summarizing Rosario).
181. See generally 24 C.F.R. § 982 (2010).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(7)(C) (2011) (emphasis added).
183. 24 C.F.R. § 982.310(d)(1)(iv) (2010). Although a business or economic reason may
constitute good cause for the eventual termination of an assisted tenancy in jurisdictions without
more searching local eviction controls, the regulations are clear that it does not constitute other
good cause for termination during the initial lease term, which must last at least a year. See 24
C.F.R. §§ 982.309(a)(1), 982.310(d)(2) (2010) (stating that the initial lease term for a Section 8–
assisted tenancy must be for at least one year, and that “[d]uring the initial lease term, the owner
may not terminate the tenancy for ‘other good cause’ . . . based on . . . a business or economic
reason”).
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“business or economic reason,” namely, the general desire “to lease the
unit at a higher rental rate.”184 This conduct was, at best, in tension with
LARSO, and it led to the litigation ultimately resolved by the Ninth
Circuit in Barrientos v. 1801–1825 Morton LLC.185
On their collective face, the form notices at issue in Barrientos and
the related litigation in California state courts obviously sought to evade
the eviction restrictions imposed by LARSO, as none of the stated
reasons for the attempted evictions in the form notices met the grounds
for permissible evictions under LARSO.186 Accordingly, hundreds of
tenants across Southern California sought to challenge the legality of the
attempted eviction notices, either by resisting subsequent eviction actions
brought by the landlords or by filing declaratory judgment actions before
an eviction action could be brought.187 The landlords typically defended
the legality of the notices, both in Barrientos and in the related litigation,
184. See, e.g., Barrientos, 583 F.3d at 1206 (reproducing the relevant section of one
instantiation of the form notices). More specifically, the notices stated that:
[t]he grounds for termination of your tenancy are based upon . . . 24 C.F.R.
982.310(d)[(1)] (iv)], which allows the landlord to terminate the rental agreement for a
business or economic reason, including but not limited to, the desire to opt-out of the
Tenant Based Section 8 Program and or the desire to lease the unit at a higher rental
rate. Prior to the service of this notice, the landlord made a business decision to no
longer participate in the Section 8 voucher program for your unit.
Id. (reproducing the relevant excerpts of one form notice). Although the specific phrasing of this
form notice varies slightly from earlier and subsequent versions of the form notice that were also
litigated in California courts at around the time of Barrientos, the essential substance is the same,
and the variations will not be discussed in greater detail in this Article. The essential substance of
this notice is also, of course, quite similar to the substance of the legal issues litigated in Rosario, in
which a New York landlord attempted to evict a Section 8–assisted tenant from a rent-controlled
unit after informing the local housing authority that it “no longer wished to participate in the
Section 8 program with respect to [the tenant], and refused the [relevant housing authority’s Section
8] subsidy payments for her apartment.” 872 N.E.2d at 862.
The notices at issue in Rosario did not frame the issue of whether unspecified business or economic
reasons constituted other good cause under the federal Section 8 statutes and regulations as clearly
as the notices in Barrientos. Accordingly, Barrientos presents a much more useful example with
which to examine and test the potential roles within a progressive-property framework of efficiency
analysis and basic economic incentives, and for this reason, it is discussed at much greater length
here. Nevertheless, the preemption questions at issue on the surface of the litigation and, more
importantly, the fundamental, low-income housing conflict that the litigation illuminates are
substantially the same.
185. 583 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2009).
186. See L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 15, § 151.09 (2012) (setting forth permissible grounds
for eviction under LARSO).
187. Many of these tenants were represented as part of a coordinated effort that included
lawyers from the Los Angeles Legal Aid Foundation; Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP; and the National
Housing Law Project. In the interest of disclosure, I was employed by Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP
while representing many of these tenant-litigants.
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by arguing that the Section 8 good-cause eviction standards set forth in
the relevant federal statute and regulations preempted the more stringent
eviction controls found in LARSO.188
The potential consequences of the landlords’ attempts to uphold
these form notices in Barrientos are best illustrated by a brief thought
experiment. Imagine two long-time neighbors, Sam and Ursula, who rent
neighboring rent-controlled units subject to LARSO from a common
landlord, Larry. Sam and Ursula both signed initial one-year leases on
their rental units several years ago. Since that time, protected by the
eviction restrictions of LARSO, they have remained in their rental units
and continued to remit regular rent payments to Larry without signing
another lease.189 Larry, for his part, has consistently sought and received
annual upward adjustments to the total rent for both units equal to the
maximum annual adjustment permitted under LARSO. All in all, Sam
and Ursula’s tenancies, total rent payments, and rental units are largely
identical except in one detail: tenant Sam receives Section 8 housing
voucher assistance, while Ursula’s tenancy is unassisted by any federal
program.190
Had the landlords’ argument about the form notices prevailed, then
landlord Larry would now be able to evict Section 8–assisted Sam with a
form eviction notice, based solely on Larry’s general business or
economic desire to raise the rent on Sam’s unit. However, Larry would
still not be able to evict unassisted tenant Ursula except on one of the
grounds specifically permitted under LARSO. Such a business or
economic reason for evicting Section 8–assisted Sam would almost
always be present because LARSO, like many other second-generation
rent-control ordinances, places caps on year-to-year rent increases within
an ongoing tenancy while allowing rent increases without restriction
during periods of permissible vacancy.191 Indeed, under the landlords’
188. More specifically, in Barrientos, the landlords argued that 24 C.F.R. § 982.310(d)(1)(iv),
which specifies that “good cause” under the federal “good cause” standard for Section 8 evictions
“may include [the] desire to lease the unit at a higher rental,” preempted the relevant provisions of
LARSO restricting the grounds for permissible evictions from rent-controlled units.
189. The factual pattern of each of these hypothetical tenancies is thus similar to the patterns
at issue in Barrientos and many of the other cases that were litigated. In general, in such rentcontrolled units in Los Angeles, tenants and landlords do not execute additional leases beyond the
initial one-year period although tenants remain in possession and landlords may seek annual
adjustments pursuant to LARSO.
190. Again, aside from this single difference between Sam and Ursula’s tenancies, assume
roughly similar lengths of tenancy, roughly equal total rents (once Sam’s voucher payments are
included), and more or less identical rental units.
191. Compare L.A. MUN. CODE ch. 15, § 151.04(A) (2012) (detailing restrictions on annual
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interpretation, this business or economic reason is both enabled and
effectively generated by the intersection of LARSO with Section 8.
More specifically, Larry’s business or economic reason for evicting
Section 8–assisted Sam is simply Larry’s pre-existing desire to raise the
rent on Sam’s unit, during a period of a permissible vacancy, beyond the
limits of the annual increases permitted for ongoing tenancies under
LARSO.192 And under the landlords’ interpretation of the regulations,
this desire becomes possible; therefore, it becomes an intelligible
business or economic reason, simply because the landlords’
interpretation makes an eviction on these grounds permissible, if only for
Section 8–assisted tenants like Sam. In one swoop, therefore, the
preemptive relationship between Section 8 and LARSO advanced by the
landlords would entirely strip away LARSO’s substantive protections
from Section 8–assisted tenancies and only Section 8–assisted tenancies,
while also dramatically enhancing the incentives for landlords to evict
Section 8–assisted tenants.193
The landlords’ arguments in Barrientos and most of the related cases
were, however, unsuccessful. Courts have generally found that the federal
good-cause eviction standards for Section 8 tenancies were intended as a
floor, setting an absolute minimum baseline to protect tenants

rent increases for existing tenancies), with L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 15, § 151.06(C) (2012)
(detailing permissible grounds for maximum rent increases, including annual adjustments and
unrestricted increases during permissible vacancies or evictions).
192. Given the assumptions we have made about Sam and Ursula’s near-identical units, we
can further assume that Larry has at least a somewhat similar desire to evict Ursula on permissible
grounds, thereby giving him the ability to raise the rent on her unit beyond the limits of the annual
increases permitted for ongoing tenancies under LARSO as well. For reasons discussed in Part
III.B, infra, Larry’s desire to raise unassisted Ursula’s rent may be less than his desire to raise
Section 8–assisted Sam’s rent, but this introductory hypothetical remains instructive so long as
Larry’s desire to raise Ursula’s rent is at least comparable to his desire to raise Sam’s rent, an
assumption that need not be compromised by this detail.
193. Indeed, the incentives to discriminate against existing Section 8 tenants that would face
landlords like Larry under such an interpretation of the federal regulations would be far stronger
than this simple hypothetical might indicate. Under the landlords’ interpretation of the regulations
advanced in Barrientos and elsewhere, after evicting Sam with the form notice and raising the rent
of Sam’s former unit by an unrestricted amount, Larry’s revenue would be maximized if he could
then re-rent the unit for the one-year term to a subsequent Section 8–assisted tenant Stella, followed
by a similar form notice eviction of Stella that would enable Larry to make yet another unrestricted
rent increase. Given the long waiting lists of qualified Section 8–assisted tenants seeking apartments
in Los Angeles and elsewhere, such a course of behavior might well be more than a purely academic
possibility. In light of the distortions rent control inflicts on the rental housing market, this behavior
might ultimately lead to the most efficient use and assignment of this specific rental unit. But it
would frustrate or undermine many of the progressive-property ends served by Section 8. Cf. supra
Part III.A (setting forth the progressive-property ends served by Section 8).
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participating in the program across the country, rather than as a ceiling
that would preempt more searching, local tenant protections where they
exist, such as the eviction controls found in LARSO.194 Beyond the
doctrinal preemption issues upon which the litigation facially turned, this
is the right result from a progressive-property perspective for several
reasons.195 First, recent progressive-property accounts seek to identify
and defend systems of property law that will provide a set of rules and
obligations to protect more vulnerable members of society, whose ability
to flourish might be harmed by the actions of property owners.196 The
holding of Barrientos and similar results in related litigation around the
country achieve this end by protecting the most vulnerable and materially
disadvantaged parties involved—namely, tenants receiving Section 8
housing vouchers in rent-controlled apartments—from exploitation by
their landlords and discriminatory treatment compared to unassisted
tenants in similar rent-controlled apartments.
The results of Barrientos and its related litigation also protect
additional progressive-property values and ends from being drastically
eroded. For example, the new progressive property seeks to constrain
and guide the behavior of property owners by emphasizing plural and
communitarian norms, the social obligations that property owners ought
to bear toward disadvantaged members of society, and the flourishing
model for owners and nonowners alike.197 Had Barrientos and its related
cases turned out the other way, the sorts of long-running Section 8–
assisted tenancies that encourage greater individual and community

194. See, e.g., Barrientos v. 1801–1825 Morton LLC, 583 F.3d 1197, 1215 (9th Cir. 2009)
(concluding, on the basis of an “analysis of the statutory language and legislative history” of Section
8, as well as several other factors, “that the HUD regulation and LARSO do not actually conflict”
because “LARSO does not impede the federal objective of providing affordable housing to lowincome families” and “therefore, is not preempted . . . to the extent the HUD regulation permits
eviction to obtain a higher rental, in the absence of contrary state or local law”).
195. To be clear, while it is important to understand the incentives facing the relevant
landlords who chose to issue these form notices, I believe that Barrientos was correctly decided and
that the results of Barrientos and its related litigation are defensible on both progressive and nonprogressive-property grounds. At a theoretical level, however, this litigation is most interesting
because it serves as a testing ground to explore the new progressive property in some theoretical
and practical detail. Accordingly, a more fulsome discussion of the other issues involved in this
litigation, as well as the overall outcome, has been left to other work. For a more detailed
examination of the legal issues involved in Barrientos, see, for example, Christian Abasto et al.,
HUD Voucher Regulations Do Not Preempt Local Eviction Controls, 43 HOUSING L. BULL. 570
(2010).
196. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.
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development198 would have been even more difficult to achieve than they
are at present, given the increased economic incentives and enhanced
ability of landlords to create rapid turnover of their Section 8–assisted
tenants in rent-controlled units.
B. Lessons from the Anti-Progressive Conflict at the Intersection of Rent
Control and Section 8
In sum, the form notices that gave rise to Barrientos and its related
litigation were profoundly antithetical to the values endorsed by recent
progressive-property accounts, while the results of this litigation were
roughly in accord with the new progressive property. However, the true
significance of Barrientos and its related cases lies beyond the
preemption issues they raise and their ultimate result. Rather, from a
progressive-property perspective, the real significance of this litigation
lies in the light it sheds on the true extent of the anti-progressive conflict
at the intersection of the federal Section 8 housing voucher program and
local rent-control ordinances.
Put another way, the landlord conduct at issue in Barrientos and the
related litigation is but one symptom—albeit a clear and unmistakable
symptom—of a much larger problem for the new progressive-property
approach. This larger problem can be summarized as follows: the
intersection of Section 8 and rent control drives landlords to inflict many
different types of disproportionate and significantly anti-progressive
burdens upon Section 8–assisted tenants in rent-controlled units, ranging
far beyond the form notices at issue in Barrientos. To appreciate the
nature and extent of this deeper problem, one must first rely, in part,
upon some basic tools of the law-and-economics approach to
property.199 More specifically, one must apply these basic law-andeconomics tools to some of the well-known anti-progressive side effects of
rent control,200 to appreciate how these known anti-progressive side
effects of rent control alone might be exacerbated by the intersection of
rent control and Section 8.

198. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
199. For more detail on what I mean by these “basic tools,” see supra notes 20, 60, and 63
and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 142, 144–147 and accompanying text. In discussing these antiprogressive side effects of rent control and the combination of rent control and Section 8, I mean
that they are negative from the standpoint of the new progressive property. Other sorts of
commonly identified negative side effects of rent control, such as its distorting impact on housing
market, are not included in this discussion.
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So, for example, many commentators have claimed that in rentcontrolled jurisdictions, landlords often seek under-the-table bribes from
prospective or existing tenants to obtain or keep a tenancy, or to obtain
services nominally guaranteed by lease or law.201 It is easy to explain
why this occurs if one uses some of the most basic, descriptive tools of
law-and-economics analysis.202 More specifically, if one assumes that at
least some landlords are primarily motivated to maximize the full market
value of their rental units, and if one knows that their efforts to do so are
frustrated by a local rent-control ordinance, then one should expect such
landlords to extract part of the rent-controlled difference by soliciting
bribes from their tenants, backed up with threats of harassment or
withheld services.203
This is an obviously anti-progressive side effect of rent control alone:
far from providing rules that promote virtuous activity and correct
nonvirtuous property owners,204 rent control encourages illegal bribery
and threats. Given the nature of Section 8 assistance, existing Section 8–
assisted tenants in rent-controlled units, by their means-tested definition,
are unable to match the ability of most unassisted existing or unassisted
prospective tenants to provide these sorts of bribes. Therefore, one ought
to expect that Section 8–assisted tenants in rent-controlled units will bear
a disproportionate share of the anti-progressive burdens of harassment,
threats, and withheld services that support these landlord demands.
From a progressive-property perspective, this compounds the antiprogressive problems created by rent control alone: under the
assumptions stated above, at the intersection of Section 8 and rent
control, one should expect these negative side effects to be inflicted

201. See, e.g., GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra note 78, at 61 (noting the prevalence of “key
money—a cash bribe for the landlord” paid by some tenants in rent-controlled units); Epstein, supra
note 140, at 763 (noting “the common practice of paying key money to vacating tenants, or of
greasing the palm of the superintendent” in rent-controlled jurisdictions). In Los Angeles, roughly
one-third of the roughly 7,000 annual tenant complaints about possible violations of LARSO
received by the City of Los Angeles Housing Department relate to allegedly illegal rent increases.
FLAMING ET AL., supra note 168, at 12.
202. See supra notes 20, 60, and 63 and accompanying text.
203. Of course, disagreement exists as to how frequently, and under what circumstances,
landlords engage in the kind of behavior described in notes 201, 206, 208, and the accompanying
text. See, e.g., Michael J. Mandel, Does Rent Control Hurt Tenants? A Reply to Epstein, 54 BROOK. L.
REV. 1267, 1271, 1273 (1989) (agreeing with Epstein that rent control systems may lead to
increased conflict between landlords and tenants, but arguing that rent control systems do not
impact levels of maintenance or building quality).
204. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.

1154

1109

The New Progressive Property

disproportionately upon the most disadvantaged tenants.205 More
specifically, application of the basic law-and-economics tools discussed
above suggests that rent-controlled tenants, especially Section 8–assisted
rent-controlled tenants, who fail to make under-the-table payments to
some landlords will face at least two problems: first, landlords will
withhold services and maintenance nominally guaranteed by lease or
law; second, landlords will undertake repeated and widespread efforts to
evict such tenants on flimsy, pretextual, or illegal grounds.
With respect to the problem of withheld services and maintenance, it
is relatively well established that rent-controlled units for all types of
tenants tend to receive substantially lower levels of landlord service and
maintenance than non-controlled units and, therefore, they tend to be
substantially more dilapidated.206 By applying the basic tools of law-andeconomics analysis, one can see that the problem will likely be
exaggerated for Section 8–assisted tenants in rent-controlled units.
Compared to unassisted existing or unassisted potential tenants in rentcontrolled units, Section 8–assisted tenants are relatively unable to make
the under-the-table payments discussed above. Accordingly, one ought to
expect that many landlords would allow rent-controlled units inhabited
by Section 8–assisted tenants to become even more disproportionately
dilapidated than rent-controlled units inhabited by unassisted tenants.
From a progressive-property perspective, this compounds the antiprogressive problem that emerges under rent control alone, for at the
intersection of Section 8 and rent control, the central progressive goal of
Section 8—namely, providing a decent place to live for low-income
households—is being directly subverted, as this negative side effect is
likely being inflicted disproportionately upon the most disadvantaged
tenants.207
With respect to the problem of repeated and widespread efforts to

205. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
206. See, e.g., GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra note 78, at 60 (noting the “abundant evidence on
rent control and quality deterioration,” and collecting sources that tend to show that “rentcontrolled units” in various jurisdictions are “disproportionately dilapidated”); Epstein, supra note
140, at 766 (noting that rent control “may well yield a reduction in the level of . . . maintenance and
security”). In Los Angeles, tenants in rent-controlled units rate their apartments as being in worse
condition than tenants in non-rent-controlled units, and they are almost twice as likely to rate their
units as "Very Poor" or "Fairly Poor." ECON. ROUNDTABLE, ECONOMIC STUDY OF THE RENT
STABILIZATION ORDINANCE AND LA HOUSING MARKET, Powerpoint Briefing to the Housing,
Community & Economic Development Committee, at 12 (Oct. 7, 2009), available at
http://bit.ly/REEeKu.
207. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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evict tenants on flimsy, pretextual, or illegal grounds, it is also relatively
well established that rent control generally tends to radically increase a
landlord’s returns from for-cause evictions or permissible vacancies.
Simply put, for-cause evictions and permissible vacancies usually provide
an escape hatch from the constraints of second-generation rent-control
ordinances.208 By applying the basic law-and-economics descriptive tools
discussed above, one can see that the problem should become even
worse, at least from a progressive-property perspective, at the
intersection of Section 8 and rent control. More specifically, given that
existing Section 8–assisted tenants in rent-controlled units are relatively
unable to make the under-the-table payments discussed above, when
compared to unassisted existing or potential rent-controlled tenants, one
would expect landlords to invest disproportionate amounts in stretching
or manufacturing for-cause grounds to terminate their rent-controlled
Section 8–assisted tenants’ tenancies.209
In sum, the use of very basic assumptions and analytic tools from the
law-and-economics approach strongly suggests that the combination of a
substantial rent-control program in a city with a significant number of
Section 8–assisted tenancies will create and then compound these
serious anti-progressive problems. Rather than providing rules that
promote virtuous activity and correct the behavior of nonvirtuous
property owners, the intersection of rent control and Section 8 provides
incentives for potentially dishonest and even illegal landlord conduct.210
Moreover, at the intersection of Section 8 and rent control, one should
expect these negative, anti-progressive side effects to be inflicted
disproportionately upon the most disadvantaged tenants.211
Although these basic law-and-economics tools have played a
208. Epstein, supra note 140, at 764–65 (noting that “rent control laws radically increase the
landlord’s returns from for cause dismissal” and therefore give landlords “strong incentives to
exploit minor breaches [of the terms of the tenancy] to escape rent control laws”). In Los Angeles,
tenant complaints about potential violations of LARSO to the Los Angeles Housing Department
about false or deceptive eviction notices are almost as common as complaints about illegal rent
increases. FLAMING ET AL., supra note 176, at 13, 128, 138.
209. One might expect this to occur in a variety of overlapping ways: landlords systematically
exploiting minor breaches of the tenancy by their Section 8 tenants; or worse, from a progressiveproperty perspective, landlords investing heavily and disproportionately in efforts to expand the
frontiers of legally permissible evictions for Section 8 tenants; or worse still, from a progressiveproperty perspective, landlords harassing Section 8 tenants into vacating with the threat of such
eviction actions; or worst of all, from a progressive-property perspective, landlords attempting to
evict Section 8 tenants for flimsy, pretextual, or even fraudulent reasons.
210. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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significant predictive and explanatory role within the broader progressive
property analysis provided immediately above, more evidence is needed
to show that the predicted problem for the values and ends of the new
progressive-property approach actually exists. Such evidence tends to be
difficult to obtain for at least two reasons: first, because it is inherently
difficult to identify and measure the predicted pretextual, quasi-legal, or
illegal landlord behavior beyond assembling anecdotes; and second,
because there is generally a great dearth of reliable information about
owner behavior in the Section 8 housing voucher program.212 Here, the
true significance of Barrientos and its related litigation reveals itself; after
all, the form notices that gave rise to Barrientos and its related litigation
are an unmistakable, indeed almost pathognomonic, symptom of the
problem predicted and described above.
Basic tools of law-and-economics analysis suggest, for example, that
some landlords will invest systematically and disproportionately to
stretch the barriers of permissible eviction of Section 8 tenants to their
legal limit and beyond to maximize the market returns on these rental
units by raising the rent without restriction during subsequent
vacancies.213 And, in fact, this is exactly what happened with the form
notices at issue in Barrientos and its related litigation. Given the unique
doctrinal nature of the landlords’ purported preemption justification,214
the notices themselves are devoid of any pretext or alternative
explanation.215 The existence of these eviction notices as well as their
number, expense, and facial language unmistakably suggest that the
deeply anti-progressive problem described and predicted above exists.216
The purpose behind the eviction notices employed by the landlord
groups, revealed by their facial language, was simply and solely to
maximize the short-term economic value of their rental property.
Motivated by this purpose—exactly the sort of purpose predicted by the

212. See, e.g., Brian Maney & Sheila Crowley, Scarcity and Success: Perspectives on Assisted
Housing, 9 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 319, 329–30 (2000) (noting the generally
fragmentary and incomplete state of knowledge about Section 8, and noting that in particular,
“aside from assuming that they want to earn a profit, very little about owners is known”).
213. See supra notes 20, 60, 63, 199, 200, 202, and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 182–184 and accompanying text (discussing the “business or other
economic reason” component of the federal good-cause eviction standard).
215. See supra note 184 (reproducing relevant language from a form notice).
216. Namely, that the intersection of Section 8 and rent control drives substantial numbers of
landlords to invest heavily and disproportionately in attempts, which are directed exclusively at
Section 8–assisted tenants in rent-controlled units, to stretch the boundaries of for-cause eviction to
their legal limit and beyond, solely to maximize the market returns from these units.
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basic law-and-economics analysis outlined above—substantial numbers of
landlords were then willing to invest truly substantial sums of money in
eviction notices that were both legally questionable and sure to be
litigated, solely to evict their most low-income tenants for immediate or
short-term financial benefit.217 Barrientos and its related litigation
therefore confirm the existence of the potential anti-progressive problem
outlined above: the most basic economic motivations, which may be
generated by the intersection of two progressive property regimes, are
capable of pushing property owners to extraordinary anti-progressive
actions of questionable legality, which tend to be directed
disproportionately at the most materially disadvantaged members of
society, further compounding this anti-progressive problem.218 For these
reasons, Barrientos and its related litigation are most significant for the
light they shed on the extent and nature of the anti-progressive conflict at
the intersection of rent control and Section 8, with consequences that
likely extend far beyond the specific example of landlord conduct at issue
in these cases.219

217. To fully appreciate the significance of the investment that landlords were willing to make
in these form notices, one must move beyond the initial costs of the notices themselves and the
litigation fees landlords were prepared to pay their own attorneys. Because of relatively common
fee-switching provisions in the initial leases signed by many of the relevant landlords and tenants,
which were applicable to legal disputes arising even after the initial lease had elapsed, many of the
landlords in Barrientos and the related litigation faced the prospect of substantial fee awards to their
tenants’ attorneys if they initiated such litigation with a form notice and lost in court. Meanwhile,
their Section 8–assisted tenant opponents, being relatively judgment-proof, did not. Such fee awards
could often be fairly significant. As an example, the Ninth Circuit upheld an award of $180,029.50
against the losing landlord in Barrientos for the tenants’ attorney’s fees through the district court
judgment alone. Barrientos v. 1801–1825 Morton LLC, 583 F.3d 1197, 1216–17 (9th Cir. 2009).
218. Barrientos and its related litigation demonstrate that landlords will invest heavily in
eviction strategies of questionable but at least unproven legality, based solely on basic economic
motivations, with substantial and disproportionately anti-progressive effects. Additionally, these
cases and the notices at their heart also strongly suggest, though they cannot prove, that the
intersection of Section 8 and rent control may drive substantial numbers of landlords to
disproportionately withhold basic services from Section 8–assisted tenants in rent-controlled units,
as described and predicted above, or to evict Section 8–assisted tenants in rent-controlled units on
truly pretextual grounds. Given the stated importance of practical and contextual judgment to
recent progressive-property accounts, the existence of this aspect of the broader problem described
above should be taken almost as seriously from a progressive-property perspective as the
disproportionate eviction aspect. See, e.g., Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property,
supra note 4, at 744 (claiming that deliberation about property and the plural values it embodies
“should include non-deductive . . . [and] contextual” reflection).
219. Similar anti-progressive conflicts may be found at the intersection of other
progressive-property regimes and policies. For example, several cases applying the Fair Housing
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (2012), show the tension between tenanting procedures designed to
maintain racially integrated communities and the anti-discrimination mandate of that statute. See,
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Accordingly, from a progressive-property standpoint, one ought to
support weakening or eliminating a rent-control ordinance such as
LARSO to protect the progressive values and ends that are served at
least as well, and more efficiently, by Section 8. More specifically,
Section 8 alone is not subject to the anti-progressive effects that arise at
the intersection of rent control and Section 8. Moreover, although rent
control alone is subject to many of these same anti-progressive side
effects, these side effects are significantly worse at the intersection of rent
control and Section 8. From a progressive-property standpoint,
therefore, the conflict at the intersection of Section 8 and rent control
requires a clear choice between promoting either rent control alone or
Section 8 alone. As argued in Part III above,220 if an anti-progressive
conflict exists at the intersection of rent control and Section 8, then from
a progressive-property perspective, one should generally seek to protect
or advance Section 8 at rent control’s expense. In this context, therefore,
and contrary to conventional wisdom, the practical implications of the
new progressive-property approach ought to be the same as the practical
implications of the law-and-economics approach: under both approaches,
rent-control ordinances such as LARSO should be eliminated or phased
out.221
What lessons can be drawn for future policy and institutional design
based on the low-income housing conflict generated by the intersection of
LARSO and the Section 8 housing voucher program? First, as has

e.g., United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1098, 1100–01 (2d. Cir. 1988) (noting
that “[w]hile quotas promote [the Fair Housing Act’s] integration policy, they contravene its
antidiscrimination policy, bringing the dual goals of the Act into conflict”). (I am grateful to Greg
Alexander for this particular suggestion.)
As this Article suggests, identifying and resolving these conflicts will be one of the great challenges
facing the new progressive property. For a discussion about what guidelines may be appropriate to
identify and resolve anti-progressive conflicts similar to the conflict illuminated by Barrientos and its
related litigation, see infra notes 221–231 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 159–61.
221. Of course, many cures for the anti-progressive conflict at the intersection of Section 8
and rent control might be worse, from the perspective of the new progressive property, than the
underlying disease. On this point as well, both the new progressive-property approach and the lawand-economics approach are agreed. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 140, at 773 (noting, in the
context of his arguments against rent control generally, that policy choices about eliminating rent
control will be complicated because “it is far more difficult to return to unregulated markets than it
is to maintain them in the first place”). Therefore, a temporary and second-best justification for
continued rent control from a progressive-property perspective might still be possible in some
situations, depending on the specific anti-progressive consequences of the available remedies for
winding up a local rent control regime, and particularly in light of the long waiting lists in many
localities for Section 8 assistance. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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already been demonstrated, this conflict shows that the use of even the
most basic law-and-economics tools, as described above, can be useful
within a progressive-property approach to help predict and describe
potential problems arising at the intersection of more or less progressive
regimes. But the problematic intersection of LARSO and Section 8
suggests even more basic lessons for the new progressive-property
approach, particularly with respect to the balancing that is necessary to
implement its plural values and ends in practice. LARSO was designed to
address a specific harm facing the community: namely, a shortage of
decent housing and critically low vacancy levels—identified in the late
1970s—that had reached “crisis level[s].”222 The intended beneficiaries of
LARSO are low-income households but also moderate-income
households, senior citizens, and other persons on fixed incomes.223 In
contrast, Section 8 is designed to aid low-income families alone in
obtaining a decent place to live, while also promoting economically
mixed housing.224
Section 8 and LARSO both have general communitarian values built
into their foundations, therefore both are also designed to serve different,
albeit overlapping, communities of interest. More specifically, Section 8
is designed to serve low-income families, a goal which fits most closely
with the new progressive property’s focus on protecting the most
vulnerable and least advantaged; however, LARSO, like many other local
rent-control ordinances, is also designed to serve moderate-income
households,225 a goal that is less central to the new progressive property.
Beyond the problematic economic incentives facing landlords at the
intersection of Section 8 and rent control is, therefore, a deeper
problem—there is no true community of interests at this intersection but
222. L.A. , CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 15,. § 151.01 (2012) (noting, as LARSO’s “Declaration of
Purpose,” that “[t]here is a shortage of decent, safe and sanitary housing in the City of Los Angeles
resulting in a critically low vacancy factor,” that “[t]his problem reached crisis level in the summer of
1978 following the passage of Proposition 13,” and the rent and eviction restrictions of LARSO are
necessary to address this “crisis” and to prevent its recurrence).
223. Id. (noting, in LARSO’s “Declaration of Purpose,” that its measures are intended to
benefit “senior citizens, persons on fixed incomes, and low and moderate income households”).
224. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (2011) (“For the purpose of aiding low-income families in
obtaining a decent place to live and of promoting economically mixed housing, assistance payments
may be made with respect to existing housing in accordance with the provisions of this section.”).
225. LARSO’s split focus on both low- and moderate-income households is typical of other
local rent-control ordinances. See, e.g., Shulman, supra note 132, at 40 (noting that “[i]t is true that
low-income households benefit from rent control, but it is just as true that the middle class benefits
as well,” and claiming that “it is in fact the middle class who brings [local rent-control ordinances]
about”).
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rather three inconsistently treated groups: landlords, whose interests are
treated neutrally at worst by Section 8 but are harmed by rent control;
moderate-income tenants, whose interests are treated neutrally at best by
Section 8 but are expressly favored by rent control;226 and low-income
tenants, whose interests are expressly favored by both rent control and
Section 8.
It should not be surprising that anti-progressive conflict can arise at
the intersection of two such progressive programs, despite their similar
aims: both Section 8 and rent control seek to protect certain overlapping
(but not identical) groups of tenants. Section 8 spreads the expense of
doing so, however, over the community at large, thereby serving
progressive ends in a manner superior to rent control. Rent control
imposes the expense more-or-less directly on yet another group within
the larger community—landlords. As a result, the intersection of Section
8 and rent control contains only fractured interest groups, one of which
has strong economic incentives to act according to the self-interest that is
singularly used to define it at the expense of progressive-property goals.
Ultimately, the low-income housing conflict at the intersection of rent
control and Section 8 suggests that to improve upon past theoretical
approaches, the new progressive property must recognize and prevent
similar conflicts in the future by distributing the costs and other burdens
of progressive property programs as widely as possible.
V. CONCLUSION
Designing or defending property regimes that successfully protect the
most vulnerable members of society or promote communitarian values
is, at best, a difficult task,227 which some would say is inherently
misguided or impossible.228 This Article’s close examination of the

226. Of course, the interests of low- and moderate-income tenants are expressly favored by
rent control only if they live in rent-controlled units, for despite the general solicitude of most rentcontrol ordinances for these groups, low- and moderate-income tenants who rent uncontrolled
apartments in rent-controlled jurisdictions will be disadvantaged by rent control.
227. For another discussion of the difficulty inherent in defending costly property programs
on communitarian grounds, see Zachary Bray, Reconciling Development and Natural Beauty: The
Promise and Dilemma of Conservation Easements, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 119, 176–77 (2010)
(suggesting that any defense of present policy regarding conservation easements held by private land
trusts must proceed in part on communitarian grounds and noting the difficulty of doing so in light
of the potential negative side effects and substantial costs of such easements).
228. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 140, at 771–72 (claiming that “cant about communitarian
ideals offers a convenient cloak to allow the ‘haves’ to exclude those unlucky enough not to have
gotten there first,” and arguing that “[i]f we do not stick with either Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks, then
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relationship between the Section 8 housing voucher program and
second-generation rent-control programs such as LARSO suggests that
this difficult task will be more likely to fail if the property regime in
question singles out a particular group within the community to bear a
disproportionate burden of its costs.229 Put another way, the task that
the new progressive property has set for itself may only be practically
possible through property regimes like Section 8, which impose the costs
of greater socioeconomic housing integration and targeted support for
low-income households on the public at large rather than property
regimes like second-generation rent controls, which pick out a particular
group to bear these costs. I have argued above that Section 8 tends to
balance the plural values of the new progressive property in a way that is
practically superior to rent control.230 I now conclude that Section 8’s
approach to the costs imposed by its progressive-property goals also
makes it more closely aligned with the theoretical underpinnings of
recent progressive-property accounts than rent control.231
The new progressive property is a work in progress. Property
regimes such as rent control and the Section 8 housing voucher program,
which predate the recent progressive-property accounts by several
decades, may more or less embody the values and ends that the new
progressive property seeks to serve. But the real promise of recent
progressive-property accounts lies in the future: the new progressive
property, by its own lights, will be an improvement on what has gone
before to the extent that it can provide a truly practical framework that
advances communitarian values and concerns for human flourishing, and
to the extent that it can provide a place for basic law-and-economics tools
that ultimately serve, rather than simply oppose, these plural values and
the old utilitarian maxim that ‘every person should count for one and only one’ is a far better way to
do business”).
229. Of course, some of the costs of rent control are born by other groups besides landlords.
See supra note 226. The disadvantage faced by these groups, however, is a side effect of rent
control, not part of its deliberate design. As a result, the position of landlords under rent control is
different than the position of these groups, and all groups under Section 8, because rent control
singles out landlords to bear the brunt of its costs.
230. See supra Section IV.B.
231. See, e.g., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS 130 (1999) (“What I
am trying to envisage then is a form of political society in which it is taken for granted that disability
and dependence on others are something that all of us experience . . . to unpredictable degrees, and
that consequently our interest in how the needs [of the disabled or dependent are] met is not a
special interest, the interest of one particular group rather than of others, but rather the interest of the
whole political society, an interest that is integral to their conception of their common good.”)
(emphasis added).
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ends. This Article’s close examination of the intersection of Section 8
and rent control helps to fill in the emerging picture of the new
progressive property, in which basic tools and concepts familiar to the
law-and-economics analysis of property can help predict and describe
practical problems for progressive values and norms, and more or less
progressive policy regimes such as rent control may need to be
abandoned because of their practically anti-progressive side effects.
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